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 Abstract  
 
The European Union is facing several challenges of constitutional, democratic, 
political and social nature. One of these challenges is the EU’s ‘social deficit’. 
The European Commission has listened to the critique and committed itself to 
reorient the European integration project towards a ‘Social Europe’. The addi-
tion of social provisions to primary law through the Treaty of Lisbon, a promised 
revision of the Posted Workers Directive and the introduction of a European 
Pillar of Social Rights are the Commission’s primary solutions to ensure that the 
Union moves beyond economic integration and tackles social concerns, pro-
motes social values and protects social rights. However, due to the Court of 
Justice’s interpretative power and prominent role in the institutional structure of 
the EU, it is crucial that the Court adjudicate cases in a socially sensitive manner 
if the EU is going to be successful in its endeavour to reorient the European 
integration project towards ‘Social Europe’.  
 
This thesis is primarily based on a study of benchmark cases in the ECJ’s juris-
prudence, both before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. By 
conducting a case law study focused on cases in which worker protection con-
flicts with the interests of the European integration project, it has been possible 
to analyse the Court’s approach in such cases and to ascertain whether the 
Court’s adjudication reflects a commitment towards the realisation of Social Eu-
rope. 
 
Conclusively, the case law study show that the Court of Justice often decide cases 
in favour of economic interests even if this tendency has slightly shifted due to 
the introduction of social provisions in the Lisbon Treaty. Whether the change 
of approach should be interpreted as reflecting a commitment towards the real-
isation of ‘Social Europe’ is difficult to answer. The Court does seem to take 
social concerns into account to a greater extent in the post-Lisbon era but one 
may argue that this is done on a merely rhetorical level. The Court still applies a 
method of adjudication that was established in the pre-Lisbon era, which views 
worker protection as a restriction that needs to be justified rather than an interest 
at equal footing with economic interests. The use of the freedom to conduct 
business, protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, to safe-
guard the contractual freedom of employers is another development that makes 
the ECJ’s potential commitment to ‘Social Europe’ even more questionable. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Today, the European Union is facing several challenges of constitutional, dem-
ocratic, political and social nature. The financial crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit 
and the rise of nationalism and anti-European populism constitute clear exam-
ples of such challenges. A challenge that has not received as much attention as 
the abovementioned is the criticism of an alleged social deficit within the Euro-
pean constitutional framework, shown both by the interests that the Union rep-
resents and by the policies it produces. The Union’s continuous liberalisation 
and deregulation has been accused of disrupting social regimes and labour law 
systems at a national level, contrary to the social compromise of a clear division 
of competence that the Union was founded upon. A new discourse has emerged 
from this criticism, focused on the necessity of a reorientation of the European 
integration project towards a ‘Social Europe’. This concept entails a European 
Union that has moved beyond economic integration and tackles social concerns, 
promotes social values and protects social rights.1  
 
In recent years, we have witnessed an increasing awareness of this issue and the 
EU, driven by the initiatives of the European Commission, which has intro-
duced various measures in an attempt to reorient and ultimately, change the 
foundation of the Union. They have tried to counterbalance the deeply rooted 
liberal interests such as free trade, undistorted competition and freedom of 
movement with, inter alia, the addition of social provisions to the Treaty of Lis-
bon, the introduction of a European Pillar of Social Rights and a promised revi-
sion of the Posted Workers Directive.2  
 
However, the fact remains that these liberal interests, which constitute the very 
foundation of the European integration project, do not go hand in hand with 
the protection of social values and rights. The tension that arises has to be re-
solved through adjudication and it is therefore up to the Court of Justice3 to 
                                                
1 SCHIEK (2017), ’Towards More Resilience for a Social EU - the Constitutionally Conditioned 
Internal Market’, pp. 1-3; GARBEN (2017), ‘The Constitutional (Im)balance between ‘the Mar-
ket’ and ‘the Social’ in the European Union’, p. 26; GIUBBONI, (2018), ‘Freedom to conduct a 
business and EU labour law’, p. 175 and ROBIN-OLIVER (2018), ‘Fundamental Rights as a New 
Frame: Displacing the Acquis’, p. 97. 
2 See section 2.4. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as the Court of Justice, the ECJ or the Court.  
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strike a balance between conflicting interests. Considering the important role of 
the Court in the European integration project, due to the preference of negative 
integration over positive, it becomes evident that the Court of Justice needs to 
contribute to the reorientation of the European integration project. Otherwise 
the realisation of ‘Social Europe’ will be nothing but a dream.4  
 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions  
Against this background, I felt compelled to research the notion of ‘Social Eu-
rope’ further and particularly examine how the Court of Justice has solved the 
‘inherent tension between the construction of the internal market and the pro-
tection of social values’, as the Advocate General Cruz Villalón phrased it in his 
Opinion in the case of Santos Palhota and Others.5  
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, to analyse relevant 
case law of the Court of Justice in order to form an understanding of the Court’s 
approach in cases where the protection of workers conflict with interests of the 
European integration project. Secondly, to examine if this approach has shifted 
due to the introduction of social provisions in the Lisbon Treaty in order to 
analyse whether the Court’s adjudication reflect a commitment towards the re-
alisation of ‘Social Europe’.  
 
In order to fulfil this purpose, the following research questions have been cho-
sen: 
• How has the Court of Justice adjudicated in cases where there is an underlying 
tension between worker protection and interests of the European integration 
project? 
 
• Does the Court of Justice’s adjudication reflect a commitment towards the 
realisation of ‘Social Europe’?  
 
                                                
4 SCHARPF (2014), ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy’, pp. 1-
4. 
5 AG Cruz Villalón in C-515/08 Santos Palhota and Others, para. 38. 
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1.3 Research Methodology  
In order to answer my research questions and ultimately, fulfil the purpose of 
this thesis, I have used an analytical legal method.6 According to Claes Sandgren, 
this is a viable method when the researcher, in addition to discerning the law, 
aims to analyse it. The analytical element entails a critical examination of the law 
which makes it a feasible method when reviewing case law of the highest in-
stance, in this case, the case law of the European Court of Justice. The analytical 
legal method is also considered to be more open and free in comparison to the 
legal dogmatic method and allows the researcher to examine material outside the 
traditional sources of law, inter alia, soft law, institutional documents, by-laws, 
implementation regulations etcetera. Furthermore, according to the analytical le-
gal view there is not only one correct answer to a legal issue, since it perceives 
the community governed by law as a system open for interpretation.7  
 
By using the analytical legal method, I have been able to describe the develop-
ment of Europe from a social perspective and thus, delineate the contours of 
the notion of ‘Social Europe’. It has also allowed me to examine and decode the 
case law of the ECJ to form an understanding of the Court’s approach and man-
agement of cases in which the protection of workers conflict with interests of 
the European integration project. Furthermore, the analytical legal method has 
provided me with a viable methodology when ascertaining if the Court’s ap-
proach has changed due to the introduction of social provisions in the Lisbon 
Treaty and when analysing whether the ECJ’s adjudication reflects a commit-
ment towards the realisation of Social Europe.8   
 
Furthermore, since the legal basis of this thesis consists of an examination and 
analysis of EU law and the case law of the European Court of Justice, the EU 
legal method has been used. The EU legal method is, according to Jane Reichel, 
to be regarded as an approach of how to deal with the legal sources of the Eu-
ropean Union.9 The hierarchy of norms in European Union law is based on the 
differentiation between primary and secondary law. Principally, primary law con-
sists of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of 
                                                
6 Translation from the Swedish term ‘rättsanalytisk metod’. 
7 SANDGREN (2015), Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare: ämne, material, metod och argumentation, pp. 
45-46. 
8 SANDGREN (2015), Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare: ämne, material, metod och argumentation, p. 48.  
9 KORLING & ZAMBONI (2013) Juridisk metodlära, pp. 109-110. 
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the European Union (TFEU), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union and the general principles of Union law as established by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Secondary law primarily consists of 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. In addition, 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU is a central source of law in the EU, next to pri-
mary and secondary legislation. The CJEU holds the task of ensuring that EU 
law is respected in the case of interpretation and application of the Treaties, 
pursuant to Article 19(1) TEU. The Court’s role in the institutional structure of 
the EU and the historical preference of negative integration over positive inte-
gration has provided the Court with decisive influence on the development of 
the European legal community. Particularly in respect of the introduction of 
general principles such as the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy of EU law, 
the protection of fundamental rights and interpretation of both primary and sec-
ondary law. The EU legal method has provided me with an approach of how to 
deal with the legal sources of the EU. It encompasses an understanding of the 
relationship between the different sources and an awareness of the prominent 
role of the Court.10 
 
1.4 Material and Research Outline 
In the second chapter of this thesis, a variety of sources, mainly constituting of 
primary law, legal doctrine and soft law, have been used to describe the devel-
opment of ‘Social Europe’. Due to the vagueness of this notion, the use of dif-
ferent types of sources with varying importance has been suitable in order to 
establish a factual basis for the coming review and analysis of the Court of Jus-
tice’s case law.  
 
After establishing what the notion of ‘Social Europe’ entails, a study of case law 
in which the Court had to strike a balance between worker protection and inter-
ests of the European integration project follows in the third chapter. The selec-
tion of cases has been based on the legal issues of the case, i.e. whether it con-
cerns a question related to worker protection, and its significance. The signifi-
cance of a case has been determined by reviewing legal doctrine in order to as-
certain which cases have affected the European legal sphere the most, both in a 
positive and a negative manner. By analysing relevant case law, I aim to form an 
understanding of the Court of Justice’s approach to and management of cases 
                                                
10 KORLING & ZAMBONI (2013) Juridisk metodlära, p. 115. 
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in the context of worker protection and whether this has changed over time, for 
example, due to the introduction of the social objectives in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
In addition, relevant legal doctrine has been studied to ensure that the critical 
analysis of the case law is substantiated to a sufficient extent. In the last chapter 
of this thesis, the findings from the previous chapter are used in combination 
with EU legal doctrine and soft law to discuss and ultimately, answer the research 
questions of this thesis. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
EU law is a highly interesting but very complex topic and delimitations is thus, 
vital. With regard to this, I have chosen to focus on the tension between two 
separate interests in the Court of Justice’s case law, namely, worker protection 
and the interests of the European integration project.  
 
As to worker protection, I ascribe the term the meaning that corresponds with 
the traditional objective of labour law, i.e. the protection of workers. To define 
this further, I would like to refer to the words of Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, a scholar 
of labour and comparative law, who stated that ‘[t]he main object of labour law 
[is] to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power 
which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship’.11  
 
Moreover, the European integration project is the process of legal, political and 
economic integration of the Member States’ systems within the European Un-
ion. This integration process is an ever on-going development and the interests 
of such a project change over time. However, in this thesis the interests of the 
European integration project refer to the original objectives upon which the integra-
tion project rests, i.e. economic integration and more specifically, the establish-
ment of an internal market. In Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome from 1957 it is 
stated that: 
 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an acceler-
ated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States be-
longing to it.12 
 
                                                
11 DAVIES & FREEDLAND (1983), Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law, p. 18. 
12 Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome. 
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This was to be accomplished by ensuring, inter alia, free trade, undistorted com-
petition and free movement of goods, services, capital and persons.13 
 
Furthermore, since I aim to analyse whether the Court of Justice’s adjudication 
reflect a commitment towards the realisation of ‘Social Europe’, I have delimited 
the concept of ‘Social Europe’ as follows. The EU’s competence within social 
areas has gradually increased and the Union now holds power to impact areas 
such as social policy,14 employment,15 citizenship,16 public health,17 vocational 
training and sport,18 education and consumer protection.19 Since the purpose of 
this thesis concerns the issue of worker protection, I have chosen to focus on 
two of the abovementioned areas, namely, social policy and employment. Social 
policy and employment constitute the core of the social dimension of the EU 
and it is therefore not inaccurate to talk about the realisation of ‘Social Europe’, 
even though the study of case law is limited to cases in which social policy and 
employment issues have been put under scrutiny by the Court of Justice.  
 
1.6 Literature Review 
The social dimension of the European Union has been researched to a large 
extent by scholars from all around Europe. The reason for this can be explained 
by the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding EU’s social sphere and the many 
unanswered questions that emanates from it. Legal scholars have examined and 
analysed the notion of ‘Social Europe’ from different perspectives and with var-
ying research objectives. The latest issue of European Constitutional Law Re-
view contains a whole special section on ‘The Displacement of Social Europe’, 
containing contributions by well-renowned legal scholars such as Claire Kilpat-
rick, Elise Muir, Sophie Robin-Olivier, Hanna Eklund, Zane Rasnača, Anne C.L. 
Davies, Stefano Giubboni, Mark Dawson and Sacha Garben.20 The issue was 
published in March 2018, indicating the relevance and importance of further 
research on this topic.  
 
                                                
13 GRÖNING & ZETTERQUIST (2010), EU: konstitution, institution, jurisdiktion, p. 27. 
14 Article 151 TFEU. 
15 Article 145 TFEU. 
16 Article 20 TFEU. 
17 Article 168 TFEU. 
18 Article 165 TFEU. 
19 Article 169 TFEU. 
20 European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, March 2018. 
 7 
In addition to legal doctrine, the European institutions have researched and con-
tributed to the discussion of ‘Social Europe’ in various ways, for example 
through research papers, reports, speeches and opinions.21  
 
The notion of ‘Social Europe’ is still a rather new idea and the vagueness of the 
concept might be the reason why research often take the form of academic arti-
cles rather than literature. It is an ever on-going development, possible to analyse 
from a lot of different perspectives. Since the research of the EU’s social dimen-
sion and the alleged social deficit mostly can be found in academic articles, they 
are written from a specific perspective and have a very limited scope. My thesis, 
on the other hand, consists of an extensive study of case law, both pre-Lisbon 
and post-Lisbon, with the aim to identify the Court’s approach towards worker 
protection as well as to analyse whether the Court’s adjudication reflects a com-
mitment towards the realisation of ‘Social Europe’.   
                                                
21 See for example ‘Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension’ by the European Commission 
and ‘Final Report of Working Group XI on Social Europe’ by the Working Group on Social 
Europe.  
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2 The notion of ‘Social Europe’ 
2.1 Introduction 
The idea of ‘Social Europe’ is a highly vague concept, partly due to the absence 
of an official definition in any of the legal acts of the European Union. Despite 
the extensive research that exists, it has remained a contested and unclear idea. 
The notion has, however, been used and referred to by several actors, such as 
EU institutions, legal scholars and politicians.22  
 
In this chapter, I aim to delineate the contours of this notion. My intention is 
not to provide a clear definition of ‘Social Europe’, but rather to present an 
overview of the development of the European Union from a social perspective. 
 
2.2 The Foundational Period  
The European integration project rests on the foundational idea of a clear divi-
sion of competence. The removal of barriers to trade and the strive towards 
economic integration and growth was to be achieved on the transnational level, 
i.e. the European level, while issues relating to labour, social policy and redistrib-
utive measures would remain a national concern. This social compromise was 
embodied in the Treaty of Rome and granted the project the approval and ac-
ceptance from the national governments of its Member States in the starting 
phase of the project. The separation between social policy areas and economic 
integration was meant to safeguard the national systems from any intolerable 
social consequences that the European integration project might lead to, a con-
cern shared by several Member States.23 They did, however, transfer competence 
in the economic sphere, providing the Union with extensive power to promote 
                                                
22 Council of the EU, The Rome Declaration; JOERGES (2015), ’Social Justice in an Ever More Di-
verse Union’, p. 92; DAMJANOVIC (2013), ‘The EU market rules as social market rules: Why 
the EU can be a social market economy’, p. 1685; JOERGES & RÖDL (2004), ’’Social Market 
Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?’, p. 2; ASHIAGBOR (2013), ’Unravelling the Embedded 
Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration’, p. 
319; GARBEN (2017), ‘The Constitutional (Im)balance between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in 
the European Union’, p. 26; GIUBBONI, STEFANO (2018), ‘Freedom to conduct a business and 
EU labour law’, p. 175; ROBIN-OLIVER (2018), ‘Fundamental Rights as a New Frame: Displac-
ing the Acquis’, p. 97 and SCHIEK (2017), ’Towards More Resilience for a Social EU - the Con-
stitutionally Conditioned Internal Market’, p. 1.  
23 DAWSON & DE WITTE (2013), ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU’, p. 229. 
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economic integration. The Union’s primary aim was to create a common market 
and the free movement for persons, goods, capital and undertakings was conse-
quently given a central position in the EU legal order, secured by Treaty provi-
sions. The potential clash between economic integration and national autonomy 
in the field of social policy and labour law was not addressed by the Union when 
this social compromise was agreed upon.24 Something that would eventually 
cause problems for the European integration project.  
 
2.3 The EU’s Social Deficit  
As the integration project developed, the original balance and division of com-
petence between the Member States and the EU began to shift. The focus of the 
Union was increasingly concentrated on creating an internal market and hence, 
removing all obstacles to trade. The priority of negative integration continued to 
cement the strong position of the Court of Justice in the Union’s institutional 
structure and its jurisprudence reflected a tendency to expand the scope of EU 
law at the expense of national autonomy, even within the exclusive competence 
of the Member States. In the Court’s effort to create an internal market, it began 
to strike down national rules in the fields of social policy and employment based 
on their incompatibility with the Treaty freedoms which ultimately restricted the 
Member States’ power to decide on policy issues that shaped the social condi-
tions of each country. The separation between social policy areas and economic 
integration, as agreed upon in the initial phase of the project, had been replaced 
by an increasing disruption of social systems at the national level. This generated 
a wider discussion about a probable ‘social deficit’ of the EU.25 
 
The growing societal concern and the apprehension that the Union’s economic 
and political objectives were disrupting the socio-cultural sphere at the national 
level led to a transfer of competence to the European level in the area of social 
policy. This transferral of power was laid down in Treaty of Maastricht and then 
in the succeeding Treaty of Amsterdam.26 In this case, the reluctance to transfer 
competence to the transnational level was set aside in an effort to induce a more 
                                                
24 BARNARD & DEAKIN (2000), ‘In search of coherence: social policy, the single market and 
fundamental rights’, pp. 332-333. 
25 SCHARPF (2010), ‘The asymmetry of European integration or why the EU cannot be a ‘social 
market economy’’, p. 218; DAWSON & DE WITTE (2013), ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU’, 
pp. 818, 824 and BARNARD & DEAKIN (2000), ‘In search of coherence: social policy, the single 
market and fundamental rights’, p. 333. 
26 CRAIG (2010), The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, p. 294. 
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acceptable balance between the economic and the social in the legal order of the 
EU. This constituted an endless dilemma for the supporters of ‘Social Europe’ 
who had to face the fact that if European governance would encompass a social 
dimension with actual context and effect, additional competence would have to 
be transferred to the European level. Social cohesion could then effectively be 
achieved, but at the expense of national autonomy and diversity, something that 
the Member States did not want to sacrifice.27 Another important change intro-
duced by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the inclusion of a section with the title 
Employment. The Union was now obliged to work towards attaining ‘a high 
level of employment and of social protection’. This innovation was mainly a re-
sult from the pressure put on the EU by countries such as Sweden, Denmark 
and France.28  
 
2.4 Reorientation of the European 
Integration Project  
The European Union’s fear of disintegration and the increasing support of ‘So-
cial Europe’ led to the introduction of various EU measures with the aim to 
reduce the alleged social deficit. In 2002, a Working Group on ‘Social Europe’ 
was established and given the task to examine and propose solutions to certain 
issues relating to the social dimension of the Union. In their final report, it was 
stated that: 
 
Social considerations constitute an essential part of European integration. The 
EU cannot be a credible force for good in the wider world if it is indifferent to 
questions of social justice and poverty in European society or to how its citizens 
are treated at work and in retirement.29 
 
The Working Group presented their view on the issue in their final report and 
stated that, inter alia, social objectives should be added to primary law. Further-
more, the Working Group concluded the report by stating that ‘the group rejects 
any artificial opposition of economic and social objectives in European policy 
or any arbitrary hierarchical order between them’.30 The Group thus clarified that 
the social and economic objectives of the EU should be treated equally and carry 
                                                
27 CRAIG (2010), The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, p. 297. 
28 BARNARD (2012), EU Employment Law, p. 22. 
29 WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL EUROPE (2003), ‘Final Report of Working Group XI on So-
cial Europe’, Brussels, 4 February 2003, CONV 516/1/03, p. 4. 
30 WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL EUROPE (2003), ‘Final Report of Working Group XI on So-
cial Europe’, Brussels, 4 February 2003, CONV 516/1/03, p. 29. 
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the same weight which might seem like an obvious thing but which has, as will 
be shown later, posed a challenge to the EU institutions and in particular, the 
Court of Justice. 
 
2.4.1 Treaty of Lisbon  
2.4.1.1 Background 
On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon31 entered into force amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity. It was initiated in 2002 as a constitutional project with the aim to create a 
European Constitution that would facilitate a deeper integration among the 
members of the Union. The project later failed and was replaced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon. Despite the ‘negative’ outcome of the project, the original European 
Constitution influenced the structure and substance of the Treaty of Lisbon to 
a relatively high degree.32 
 
2.4.1.2 The Union’s competence  
The Lisbon Treaty only introduced minor modifications to the EU’s compe-
tence within the social sphere. In the areas of social policy and employment, no 
changes were introduced. Thus, in the area of employment, the EU can support 
and complement the Member States in attaining a high level of employment33 as 
well as ‘adopt incentive measures designed to encourage cooperation between 
Member States’.34  
 
In the field of social policy, the EU shares competence with the Member States.35 
The areas listed in Article 153(1) establish in what fields the EU can act to ‘sup-
port and complement the activities of the Member States’36 which relates to, inter 
alia, working conditions, social security and social protection of workers and 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated.37 
                                                
31 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306 (hereinafter referred to 
as the ‘Lisbon Treaty’ or ‘Treaty of Lisbon’). 
32 MICKLITZ (2010), ‘Failure or Ideological Preconceptions – Thoughts on Two Grand Pro-
jects: The European Constitution and the European Civil Code’, p. 12. 
33 Article 147 TFEU. 
34 Article 149 TFEU. 
35 Article 4(2)(b) TFEU. 
36 Article 53(1) TFEU. 
37 Article 53(1)(b), (c) och (d) TFEU. 
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2.4.1.3 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The Treaty of Lisbon marked a turning point for ‘Social Europe’, since it con-
cretised the vague ambition to promote and protect the social dimension of the 
EU in various ways. In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union38 was granted its legally binding character and the fundamental 
rights in the Charter should now be treated as equivalent to, for example, the 
Treaty freedoms.39 This was also a significant improvement for ‘Social Europe’ 
since social rights, such as workers’ right to information and consultation within 
the undertaking, right of collective bargaining and action, protection in the event 
of unjustified dismissal and right to fair and just working conditions, can be 
found in Chapter IV under the title Solidarity.40 
 
2.4.1.4 Article 3(3) TEU  
One of the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations was the modification of the EU’s objec-
tives. It added social objectives to the previously stipulated economic and polit-
ical objectives and can be viewed as an indication of the Union’s will to reorient 
the European integration project. The objectives can be found in Article 3(3) 
TEU, which reads as follows: 
 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, 
a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and so-
cial progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. 
 
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social jus-
tice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between gener-
ations and protection of the rights of the child. 
 
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among 
Member States. 
 
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Eu-
rope's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.41 
 
                                                
38 Hereinafter referred to as the ’Charter’ or the ’EU Charter’. 
39 LEBECK (2016), EU-stadgan om grundläggande rättigheter, p. 35 and SCHIEK (2017), ’Towards 
More Resilience for a Social EU - the Constitutionally Conditioned Internal Market’, p. 1. 
40 Article 27, 28, 30 and 31 of the EU Charter. 
41 Article 3(3) of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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In comparison to the previous Treaty, there are references to the ‘social’ in Ar-
ticle 3(3) which indicates the commitment made by the EU institutions to steer 
the project in a more socially sustainable direction.42 In my opinion, the intro-
duction of social objectives can be viewed as a concretisation of the strive to-
wards ‘Social Europe’, making it a turning point, provided that the new objec-
tives are both promoted and respected by the EU institutions, including the 
Court of Justice. Professor Catherine Barnard states that Article 3(3) of the Lis-
bon Treaty ‘emphasizes the links between the social and economic provisions of 
the Treaty’.43  
 
One of the innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is the concept of a 
‘social market economy’. The conceptualisation of the EU as a social market 
economy has been widely discussed by legal scholars, especially due to the lack 
of a clear and precise definition from the EU. Some scholars have defined it as 
a constitutional principle which postulates the desired character of the future 
European Union.44 Others describe it as the successful result of a long struggle 
by Social Democrats and Christian Democrats to reorient the European integra-
tion project towards a more social EU.45 It has also been considered to reflect a 
compromise due to the insertion of the phrase ‘highly competitive’ before ‘social 
market economy’.46 Professor Fritz W. Scharpf has researched the notion of a 
‘social market economy’ and links the meaning of it to the social market econo-
mies of countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Austria. These countries’ economic order is founded on the idea of a free market 
but with a comprehensive welfare system and legal regulations that complement 
and counterbalance that freedom.47 
 
The EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, László 
Andor, gave a speech in 2011 about ‘Building a social market economy in the 
European Union’ and stated that: 
 
[T]he social market economy is based on two clearly distinct but complementary 
pillars: on the one hand, the enforcement of competition, and on the other, social 
                                                
42 CRAIG (2010), The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, pp. 312-313. 
43 BARNARD (2012), EU Employment Law, p. 27. 
44 JOERGES & RÖDL (2004), ’’Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?’, p. 10. 
45 SCHARPF (2010), ‘The asymmetry of European integration or why the EU cannot be a ‘social 
market economy’’, pp. 211-212. 
46 CRAIG (2010), The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, p. 313. 
47 SCHARPF (2010), ‘The asymmetry of European integration or why the EU cannot be a ‘social 
market economy’’, p. 212. 
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policy measures to guarantee social justice by correcting negative outcomes and 
bolster social protection.48 
 
Thus, the social market economy could be viewed as reflecting an economic 
order that balances a social dimension which promotes and protects the social 
wellbeing of its citizens with market competition and economic growth.49  
 
2.4.1.5 Article 9 TFEU 
In addition to the social objectives in Article 3(3) TEU, the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced a new horizontal social clause that requires the EU to consider ‘the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social pro-
tection, the fight against social exclusion […]’ when ‘defining and implementing 
its policies and activities’.50 Article 9 hence constitutes a further indication of the 
reorientation of the European integration project.51 
 
2.5 European Debt Crisis until today 
The efforts to establish a ‘Social Europe’ were counteracted by the EU’s re-
sponse to the European debt crisis, which amplified the previous allegations of 
a social deficit in the EU legal order. The efforts to save the Union from a fi-
nancial collapse led to continued expansion of the Union’s competence, at the 
expense of national autonomy, and the requirement for Member States in need 
of financial support to renegotiate and ultimately, reform their social systems. 
The EU had thus begun to influence the redistributive policies of Member States 
through legislative measures, a course of action far beyond what was initially 
agreed upon at the beginning of the integration project.52 The critique of the EU 
grew and the reorientation towards a ‘Social Europe’ seemed to be nothing but 
a distant and unrealistic dream.  
 
Despite these hardships, the EU continued its endeavour to transform the Un-
ion and President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has since 
                                                
48 ANDOR, LÁSZLÓ (2011), European Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social Af-
fairs and Inclusion, ‘Building a social market economy in the European Union’, 
SPEECH/11/695. 
49 ANDOR, LÁSZLÓ (2011), European Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social Af-
fairs and Inclusion, ‘Building a social market economy in the European Union’, 
SPEECH/11/695. 
50 Article 9 TFEU. 
51 BARNARD (2012), EU Employment Law, p. 28. 
52 DAWSON & DE WITTE (2013), ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU’, pp. 824-825. 
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he took office in 2014, repeatedly highlighted the importance of ensuring that 
European governance encompass a social dimension. In 2017, the Commission 
published a Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe, presenting 
what they believed to be the challenges facing ‘Social Europe’ and how to turn 
their ‘aspirations into reality’.53 According to the Commission, the EU has always 
contained a social dimension in addition to its economic goals and ‘there is now 
a strong European […] commitment to uphold fundamental values, rights and 
social objectives.’54 Furthermore, The European Commission is of the opinion 
that the EU is at a crossroads and argues: 
 
As the Europe of 27 looks to shape its future, the discussion on the social di-
mension of our Union is timely and essential. In recent years, Europe has been 
busy with ’firefighting’, responding to one crisis after another. Now is the time 
to draw lessons and to open a new chapter. For this, we must take a longer-term 
perspective and confront the more profound transformations in our economy 
and society.55  
  
The European Commission’s ambition to reorient the European integration 
project towards a more social Europe has led it to present multiple measures in 
the hope of fixing the alleged social deficit. In the end of 2017, the Commission 
presented its European Pillar of Social Rights, encompassing three different cat-
egories of protection. Namely, ‘equal opportunities and access to the labour mar-
ket’, ‘fair working conditions’ and ‘social protection and inclusion’.56 By intro-
ducing a European Pillar of Social Rights, the Commission hoped to reinvigorate 
convergence in the Union while simultaneously guaranteeing the protection of 
social rights.57 However, since the measure constitutes soft law and thus not le-
gally binding, it is highly questionable if it will have any real impact.  
 
Another discussion that reflects the on-going reorientation towards a ‘Social Eu-
rope’ is the call for a revision of the Posted Workers Directive. On March 8 
2016, the Commission proposed a reform of the directive with the aim to estab-
lish the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’.58 After months 
                                                
53 COMMISSION (2017), ‘Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe’, p. 3. 
54 COMMISSION (2017), ‘Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe’, p. 6. 
55 COMMISSION (2017), ‘Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe’, pp. 6-7. 
56 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(2017), ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’. 
57 PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER (2015), ‘State of the 
Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity’. 
58 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, COM(2016) 128 final, p. 4. 
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of negotiations, a common understanding of the targeted revision of the di-
rective was reached between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament 
and a joint statement was presented on March 1 2018, taking the proposal one 
step closer to a legal reform.59  
 
However, the contemporary discourse of ‘Social Europe’ is often lacking or 
downplaying one crucial aspect of the European integration project. Namely, the 
role of the Court of Justice. The Court has become a highly influential actor in 
the judicial world of the EU and scholars have discussed the potential difficulties 
in creating a social dimension due to the fact that the Court itself is part of the 
‘social legitimacy problem of the European integration process’.60 The Court of 
Justice’s commitment to ‘Social Europe’ is hence critical for the success of the 
reorientation of the European Union. An analysis of the Court’s case law, both 
before and after the introduction of social objectives through the Lisbon Treaty, 
is therefore pertinent to form an understanding of whether the Court has truly 
committed itself to the creation of ‘Social Europe’ or if it has continued to pri-
oritise economic integration.  
                                                
59 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2018), Joint statement on the revision of the Posting of Workers 
Directive, 1 March 2018. 
60 FEENSTRA (2017), ‘How Can the Viking/Laval Conundrum Be Resolved? Balancing the 
Economic and the Social: One Bed for Two Dreams?’, p. 313. 
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3 Case Law Study   
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, case law in which the Court of Justice has struck a balance be-
tween worker protection and interests of the European integration project is 
examined. I will first discuss cases in the pre-Lisbon era before I continue with 
an examination of cases that was adjudicated after the Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force. By doing this, I aim to answer the first research question of this thesis. 
Namely, How has the Court of Justice adjudicated in cases where there is an underlying 
tension between worker protection and interests of the European integration project? I will 
analyse and answer this question continuously throughout this chapter. 
 
Before we turn to the case law study, the Court of Justice’s function and role in 
the European integration project will be elaborated on. By accentuating the 
Court’s important task in terms of its interpretative power, it becomes evident 
why it is crucial that the ECJ respects and promotes social values if ‘Social Eu-
rope’ is going to stand any chance of realisation.  
 
3.2 The Court of Justice  
3.2.1 Priority of negative integration 
In the beginning of the European integration project, the main focus of the Un-
ion was to establish an internal market and the removal of barriers was conse-
quently, a priority for the Union. The effectiveness of negative integration in lieu 
of politically approved harmonising measures, i.e. positive integration, awarded 
the Court an important role in the pursuit of an internal market. When legislative 
proposals were facing resistance in the Council, the Court could circumvent such 
political blockades and strike down national rules that did not coincide with the 
interests of the European integration project. Thus, judicial law-making by the 
ECJ was prioritised over the political process and resulted in a European court 
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with a lot of power, far exceeding a mere interpretative role. The Treaty free-
doms came to serve as the Court’s primary tool in its strive for economic inte-
gration.61 
 
3.2.2 Function of the Court  
Today, the function of the Court is to uphold the treaties and ensure a uniform 
interpretation and application of EU law in all Member States. This is done 
through various forms of legal proceedings, one of them being the preliminary 
ruling procedure. National courts may, and in some cases must, ask for guidance 
if they are uncertain of the interpretation of European Union law.62 The inter-
pretation or clarification stated in the judgment are not only relevant for the case 
at hand, but for the whole EU due to the rulings erga omnes effect.63 In practice 
this means that once the ECJ has decided a case, the ruling is enforceable in all 
Member States and must therefore be respected throughout the Union and by 
every judicial actor.64 
 
3.2.3 Tools of legal reasoning 
Essential to the interpretative role of the Court of Justice is the arduous task of 
balancing conflicting interests. There is no guidance in the Treaties of how the 
Court is supposed to execute this delicate task and the Court has therefore de-
veloped certain tools of legal reasoning.65 
 
When one of the conflicting interests is a Treaty freedom, i.e. free movement of 
goods, persons, services or capital, the Court apply the ‘rule of reason’ approach. 
This essentially means that the Court examines whether a national measure is 
justified in light of the underlying objective, despite having a restrictive effect on 
a Treaty freedom. In this assessment, the principle of proportionality is an im-
portant component. This principle is used in a rather flexible manner by the 
                                                
61 SCHARPF (2010), ‘The asymmetry of European integration or why the EU cannot be a ‘social 
market economy’’, p. 215 and TUORI (2015), European Constitutionalism, p. 234. 
62 Court of Justice, ‘Jurisdiction’ < https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/en/>, ac-
cessed 16 May 2018. 
63 BLAUBERGER & SCHMIDT (2017), ‘The European Court of Justice and its political impact’, 
pp. 910-911. 
64 BLANPAIN (2012), European Labour Law, p. 80. 
65 BARTL & LEONE (2015), ‘Minimum harmonisation and Article 16 CFR: Difficult Times 
Ahead for Social Legislation?’, p. 8. 
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Court but it is often described as comprising of three elements. Firstly, the na-
tional measure has to be an appropriate means for ensuring the achievement of 
the objective. Secondly, the national measure should not go beyond what is nec-
essary to attain the objective in question. Thirdly, the national measure has to be 
proportionate in relation to the objective that it aims to attain, in other words, 
reasonable.66   
 
If the case at issue concerns a fundamental right, the Court is supposed to do a 
fundamental rights review in order to ascertain whether a restriction to the right 
in question is legitimate. Article 52(1) of the EU Charter provides guidance of 
what this review entails. It states that: 
 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest rec-
ognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.67 
 
3.3 Case law pre-Lisbon  
3.3.1 Rush Portuguesa & Albany 
My starting point is the case of Rush Portuguesa68 from 1990. The case concerned 
a Portuguese company that was awarded a subcontract in the construction pro-
ject of a railway between Paris and the Atlantic Coast. The wages of the Portu-
guese employees were equivalent to what was standard in Portugal but substan-
tially lower than French wages. This sparked a conflict in which the French au-
thorities tried to restrict the possibility for the Portuguese company to accept 
the contract and the conflict eventually ended up before the Court of Justice. 
The ECJ ruled, based on the principle of freedom to provide services, that the 
Portuguese company was within its right when it took on the contract. However, 
the Court made an important obiter dictum as a response to the concerns raised 
by France regarding the risk of social dumping. The Court stated: 
 
[I]n response to the concern expressed in this connection by the French Gov-
ernment, that Community law does not preclude Member States from extending 
their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of 
                                                
66 GRÖNING & ZETTERQUIST (2010), EU: konstitution, institution, jurisdiktion, p. 114. 
67 Article 52(1) of the EU Charter.  
68 C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa, Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 March 1990, 
EU:C:1990:142. 
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industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily within their territory, 
no matter in which country the employer is established; nor does Community 
law prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.69 
 
The statement neutralised the ruling’s deregulatory potential by granting Mem-
ber States a possibility to protect themselves from socially unacceptable compe-
tition from low-wage countries which, from a worker protection perspective, 
was highly positive. However, the ruling in Rush Portuguesa created a link between 
the social sphere at the national level and economic integration and thus, elimi-
nated the barrier that previously separated the internal market and national la-
bour law.70  
 
Albany71 is another case in which the Court confirmed the linkage between na-
tional labour law and internal market rules, in this case, competition law. In its 
judgment, the Court recognised that collective agreements on the national level 
could potentially restrict competition. It concluded that Article 85, now Article 
101(1) TFEU, which prohibits agreements that is incompatible with the internal 
market from a competition perspective, does not apply to collective agreements. 
The Court stated that ‘the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements 
would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Arti-
cle 85(1)’.72 The Court also referred repeatedly to the Treaty’s social policy pro-
visions before stating that it ‘follows from an interpretation of the provisions of 
the Treaty as a whole’73 that such agreements falls outside the scope of Article 
85. In this case, the Court favoured the collective bargaining process and ulti-
mately, granted it a protected place within the EU legal order by preserving its 
autonomy.74  
 
In both of these cases, the ECJ struck a balance between competing interests 
that benefitted the integration project as well as the protection of workers. It 
secured the freedom to provide services in Rush Portuguesa while simultaneously 
refraining from disrupting French labour law. In Albany, the Court concluded 
that collective agreements were exempted from judicial examination under Arti-
                                                
69 C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa, para. 18. 
70 GIUBBONI (2018), ‘Freedom to conduct a business and EU labour law’, p. 179. 
71 C-67/96, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Judgment of the 
Court of 21 September 1999, EU:C:1999:430. 
72 C-67/96, Albany v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, para. 59. 
73 C-67/96, Albany v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, para. 60. 
74 ASHIAGBOR (2013), ’Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare 
Law in the Context of EU Market Integration’, p. 311. 
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cle 85 which indicates once again the Court’s restrictive approach towards af-
fecting the national systems on the basis of competition rules, in this case a 
Treaty provision regarding competition policy. I believe that these two cases in-
dicate that the Court respected national autonomy and had an ambition to keep 
economic integration separated from the ‘social’, i.e. national labour law. This 
was also in line with the original social compromise upon which the integration 
project is founded.75 
 
3.3.2 Laval and Viking 
In 2007, the ECJ decided two cases which suggested that the Court had recon-
sidered its previous approach to cases in which internal market rules clash with 
national labour law.76  
 
In the case of Laval,77 the eponymous construction company had posted workers 
to its subsidiary, Baltic Bygg, located in Sweden. The trade union in Sweden 
wanted Baltic Bygg to enter into a collective agreement that granted their work-
ers better terms but the negotiations turned out unsuccessful, and Laval entered 
into a collective agreement with a Latvian trade union instead.78 As a response, 
the Swedish trade union initiated collective action in the form of a blockade 
which resulted in the termination of Baltic Bygg’s contract and ultimately led to 
bankruptcy.79 Laval then brought an action before the Swedish Labour Court 
claiming that the collective action was unlawful on the basis of its right to free-
dom of movement and in particular, Laval’s right to provide services in Sweden. 
The Swedish Labour Court referred the case to the Court of Justice for a pre-
liminary ruling. 80  
 
The second case, Viking,81 concerned a conflict between Viking Line, a company 
that operated a ferry between Estonia and Finland, and the Finnish Seaman’s 
Union, FSU, who was party to the collective agreement that the employees of 
                                                
75 GIUBBONI (2018), ‘Freedom to conduct a business and EU labour law’, pp. 178-179. 
76 FEENSTRA (2017), ‘How Can the Viking/Laval Conundrum Be Resolved? Balancing the 
Economic and the Social: One Bed for Two Dreams?’, p. 310. 
77 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbeta-
reförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, EU:C:2007:809. 
78 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, paras 27-28, 33. 
79 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, paras 34, 38. 
80 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, paras 39-40. 
81 C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 11 December 
2007, EU:C:2007:772. 
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Viking Ling were employed under.82 Due to financial reasons, Viking Line 
wanted to reflag their ferry to operate under Estonian flag and therefore enter 
into a collective agreement with an Estonian trade union instead of FSU.83 With 
the support of ITF, the International Transport Workers’ Federation, FSU en-
couraged all member unions to decline any initiative from Viking Line to nego-
tiate which ultimately prevented Viking Line from entering into a collective 
agreement with an Estonian trade union.84 The FSU subsequently announced its 
intention to take collective action which resulted in Viking Line seeking an in-
junction that would prohibit the FSU to do so. They based their claim on the 
right to freedom of establishment.85 The Court of Appeal ultimately referred the 
question to the ECJ, asking whether Viking Line could rely on this provision 
when challenging the collective action by FSU.86  
 
The following analysis will be structured based on the three issues that the Court 
of Justice discussed in the cases of Laval and Viking. Firstly, the question of 
whether the right to take collective action falls outside the scope of EU internal 
market law. Secondly, the question of whether the Treaty freedoms are applica-
ble in horizontal situations, i.e. between private parties. Thirdly, if a national pol-
icy can constitute an obstacle to the internal market. In addition, the Court’s 
balancing exercise will be examined. 
 
3.3.2.1 Collective action and the scope of EU law 
In Laval, the trade union argued that the right to take collective action should be 
viewed as falling outside the scope of EU internal market law since the Union 
has no competence in that area.87 They argued that an application of the Treaty 
freedoms potentially would endanger workers’ right to collective bargaining and 
their right to strike.88 The Court, however, disagreed and stated that although 
the right to take collective action falls within the area of competence of the 
Member States, they must ‘exercise that competence consistently with Commu-
nity law’.89 Based on this, the Court concluded that EU internal market law, in 
this case the freedom to provide services, is applicable to a collective action such 
                                                
82 C-438/05, Viking Line, paras 6-7. 
83 C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 9. 
84 C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 12. 
85 C-438/05, Viking Line, paras 13, 22-23.  
86 C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 32. 
87 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, paras 86-87. 
88 ASHIAGBOR (2013), ’Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare 
Law in the Context of EU Market Integration’, p. 311. 
89 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 87.  
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as the one in Laval.90 In the case of Viking, the ECJ came to the same conclusion 
and argued, in reference to the applicability of the provision on freedom of es-
tablishment, that:  
 
[…] in principle, collective action initiated by a trade union or a group of trade 
unions against an undertaking in order to induce that undertaking to enter into a 
collective agreement, the terms of which are liable to deter it from exercising 
freedom of establishment, is not excluded from the scope of that article.91  
 
3.3.2.2 Applicability of the Treaty freedoms 
Another issue that was addressed in the judgments is the question of whether 
EU internal market law, e.g. the Treaty freedoms, applies to situations concern-
ing private parties. By reference to its case law in which Treaty provisions were 
granted horizontal effect, the ECJ concluded that the Treaty freedoms do not 
only apply to the public sphere but also to parties who ‘participate in the drawing 
up of agreements seeking to regulate paid work collectively’.92 
 
3.3.2.3 Restriction of the Treaty freedoms 
The third issue that Laval and Viking touched upon was the question of whether 
a national policy could be viewed as restricting or interfering with trade and the 
creation of the internal market. The Court’s case law had previously extended 
the scope of internal market law to apply to situations where a national policy 
affected the market access of a service provider or an individual or company 
wanting to establish in another Member State. This development also entailed 
that even measures that treated all parties the same, i.e. non-discriminatory 
measures, could be viewed as a breach of the Treaty if they interfered with the 
access to the market.93 In Laval, the ECJ stated that the right to take collective 
action ‘make it less attractive, or more difficult, for such undertakings to carry 
out construction work in Sweden’, resulting in the conclusion that it constitutes 
a restriction to the freedom to provide services.94 In Viking, the ECJ stated that 
collective action would make the enjoyment of the right to freedom of establish-
ment become ‘less attractive, or even pointless’.95 The Court furthermore stated 
                                                
90 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 88. 
91 C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 55. 
92 C-438/05, Viking Line, paras 64-66. 
93 ASHIAGBOR (2013), ’Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare 
Law in the Context of EU Market Integration’, p. 312. 
94 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 99. 
95 C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 72. 
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that by using collective action in an effort to implement the trade union’s ‘policy 
of combating the use of convenience’, i.e. preventing Viking to re-flag their ferry 
to another country in order to give their employees lower wages, the action ‘must 
be considered to be at least liable to restrict Vikings exercise of its right of free-
dom of establishment’.96 
 
3.3.2.4 Balancing of conflicting interests 
If a collective action ultimately triggers EU internal market law, the court dealing 
with such a case needs to balance the two conflicting rights, in this case, freedom 
of establishment or freedom to provide services and the (social) right to collec-
tive action. In the cases of Laval and Viking, the Court stated that if a national 
policy restricts a Treaty freedom, that policy is only acceptable ‘if it pursues a 
legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons 
of public interest’. 97 Furthermore, the Court also clarified that even if a restric-
tive national policy would fulfil this requirement it ‘would still have to be suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it’.98 In other words, the restriction needs to 
be both justifiable and proportionate in order to be lawful.  
 
As to the question of justification, the ECJ started by recognising the fundamen-
tal character of the right to take collective action. In Viking, the ECJ also clarified 
that embodied in the fundamental right to take collective action is the right to 
strike.99 After this pronouncement, the Court stated that ‘the protection of fun-
damental rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction 
of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental free-
dom guaranteed by the Treaty’.100 Thus, the right to collective action could be 
viewed as a justified restriction per se.  
 
Although the right to collective action could be qualified as a justified restriction, 
it also needed to pass the proportionality assessment. In relation to this, the ECJ 
stated that national courts should examine whether a trade union had ‘other 
means at its disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment […] 
and […] whether that trade union had exhausted those means before initiating 
                                                
96 C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 73.  
97 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 101 and C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 75. 
98 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 101 and C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 75. 
99 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 91 and C-438/05, Viking Line, para. 44. 
100 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para. 93 and C-438/05, Viking Line para. 45.  
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such actions’.101 Thus, the ECJ subjected the right to collective action to a strict 
test of proportionality, only justified as a last resort of action.  
 
In my opinion, the ECJ’s ruling in Laval and Viking illustrates the difficulty in 
reconciling conflicting interests. On the one hand, trade unions and national 
governments wanted the Court to respect national autonomy and prioritise col-
lective social rights and the protection of workers. On the other hand, the Court 
was faced with two cases in which a national policy restricted a Treaty freedom 
and thus, constituted a barrier to the internal market. The Court balanced these 
two conflicting interests but chose to prioritise the interests of the European 
integration project, i.e. the Treaty freedoms, at the expense of national labour 
systems and ultimately, the protection of workers.102 The strict test of propor-
tionality has been especially criticised by scholars. For example, Professor Dia-
mond Ashiagbor states that ‘[t]he effect of the standard of scrutiny in such cases 
is to negate the very substance of one of the rights that the Court is seeking to 
balance’.103 According to Professor Stefano Giubboni, the proportionality as-
sessment was constructed in such a manner to guarantee the economic freedom 
of the employers.104  
 
The fact that the Court acknowledges the right to collective action as a funda-
mental right should be viewed as an important pronouncement from a worker 
protection perspective. However, a closer look at the Court’s reasoning shows 
that the value of this recognition is questionable. Even though the cases of Laval 
and Viking concerned two conflicting rights of fundamental character, the funda-
mental right to collective action was classified as a restriction to the fundamental 
freedoms,105 i.e. the Treaty freedoms, indicating its inferior position in the EU 
legal hierarchy. By doing this, the EU clearly prioritised the interests of the Eu-
ropean integration project and companies’/employers’ freedom of establish-
ment and freedom to provide services over workers’ right to collective action. 
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According to Professor Anne Davies, this type of reasoning serves to ‘reconcep-
tualise employers’ interests in a way which presents them as at least as weighty 
as, if not more so than, the fundamental social rights of workers’.106  
 
3.3.3 Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg 
In 2008, the Court decided two cases in which worker protection and interests 
of the European integration project once again needed to be balanced. 
 
In Rüffert,107 the ECJ had to decide on the legality of a national German law 
concerning public contracts. According to this law, only companies that were 
willing to pay their employees equivalent wages to those laid down in the appli-
cable sectoral collective agreement, i.e. the collective agreement in force at the 
work place, were eligible for public contracts in a public procurement procedure. 
The ECJ held that this type of requirement could constitute a restriction to the 
freedom to provide services since undertakings from other Member States with 
lower wages would face an ‘additional economic burden that may prohibit, im-
pede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the host Member 
State’.108 Furthermore, the ECJ addressed the question of a possible justification 
and concluded that the restriction cannot be considered as necessary to ensure 
the protection of workers. The Court explained this by referring to the sectoral 
application of the requirement and the fact that the wages would exceed the 
minimum rate of pay as determined by national legislation, stating that if this 
requirement would be necessary from a worker protection perspective, the same 
rate of pay would also be required for the private sphere and/or for the whole 
relevant sector.109   
 
Shortly after the ruling in Rüffert, another case was brought before the Court of 
Justice. The case of Commission v Luxembourg110 was one out of several infringe-
ment proceedings driven by the Commission to affirm the Court’s market-ori-
ented approach to cases in which worker protection and interests of the Euro-
pean integration project clashed. In the present case, the ECJ gave a restrictive 
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interpretation of the social policy derogation in the Posting of Workers Di-
rective, limiting the Member States’ possibility to require higher social standards 
based on public policy grounds.111  
 
3.4 Case law post-Lisbon 
3.4.1 Commission v Germany  
In 2010, the ECJ decided another case affecting the already constrained relation-
ship between fundamental freedoms and worker protection. In the Commission v 
Germany112 judgment, the European Commission brought infringement proceed-
ings against Germany, claiming non-fulfilment of obligations under two EU di-
rectives regulating public procurement. The directives required Member States 
to put out a call for tenders at the EU level, and not only domestically which 
local authorities in Germany had failed to do with certain contracts for pension 
services. The authorities had awarded the public contracts directly to bodies and 
undertakings referred to in a collective agreement, resulting in the Commission’s 
infringement claim.113  
 
Of relevance for this thesis is the Court of Justice’s discussion concerning the 
applicability of the public procurement directives to the contract awards in the 
case. Germany claimed, in reference to the judgement in Albany, that the 
awarded contracts should fall outside the scope of the directives, since these 
contracts ‘implemented a collective agreement negotiated between management 
and labour’.114 In the case of Albany, the Court concluded that agreements, ne-
gotiated between management and labour, should be exempted from judicial 
examination under a competition provision in the Treaty since the social policy 
objectives pursued by such an agreement otherwise would be ‘seriously under-
mined’.115  
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The Court started out by once again recognising the right to collective bargaining 
as a fundamental right, explicitly referring to Article 28 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU and emphasising that the Charter enjoys the same legal 
value as the Treaties. However, the Court continued by stating that the social 
objective pursued by the collective agreement in addition to the fundamental 
character of the right does not mean that the local authorities, i.e. the employers, 
automatically fall outside the scope of the directives, which implement the free-
dom to provide services as well as the freedom of establishment in public pro-
curement procedures.116 
 
In paragraphs 45 and 46, the Court responds to Germany’s main argument and 
reference to the judgment in Albany. According to the Court, the reasoning in 
the Albany case does not apply, since the main question concerns the fact that 
local authorities decided to award public contracts directly to bodies and under-
takings in Germany, contrary to the public procurement directives which imple-
ment the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment. Thus, 
the Court did not accept the analogy between competition law and the Treaty 
freedoms, as presented by Germany. The ECJ further stated that the process of 
awarding public contracts to certain bodies and undertakings ‘does not affect the 
essence of the right to bargain collectively’, in contrast to the social objective 
pursued by a collective agreement.117 Based on this, the Court concluded that 
‘the fact that the contract awards at issue follow from the application of a col-
lective agreement does not, in itself, result in the present instance being excluded 
from the scope’.118 
 
This conclusion led to another question being raised, namely the one about rec-
onciliation of conflicting interests. In the case at hand, the Court stated that the 
fundamental right to collective bargaining ‘must be exercised in accordance with 
European Union law’119 and thus, ‘reconciled with the requirements stemming 
from the freedoms protected by the […] Treaty’,120 which the directives aim to 
implement. It also needs to be ‘in accordance with the principle of proportion-
ality’.121 Further down in the judgement, the ECJ again refers to the reconcilia-
tion of conflicting interests, this time between ‘the requirements related to at-
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tainment of the social objective pursued here by the parties to the collective bar-
gaining with the requirements stemming from [the] Directives […]’.122 In the 
following paragraph, the Court stated that this assessment contains a ‘verifica-
tion’ as to whether: 
 
[A] fair balance was struck in the account taken of the respective interests in-
volved, namely enhancement of the level of the retirement pensions of the work-
ers concerned, on the one hand, and attainment of freedom of establishment and 
of the freedom to provide services, and opening up to competition at European 
Union level, on the other.123 
 
Without getting into the details of the proportionality assessment conducted by 
the Court in paragraphs 53 to 65 of the judgement, the overall conclusion was 
that ‘compliance with the directives concerning public service contracts does not 
prove irreconcilable with attainment of the social objective pursued by the sig-
natories of the [collective agreement] in the exercise of their right to bargain 
collectively.’124 
 
From a worker protection perspective, this judgement can be considered to con-
tain both positive and negative elements. First of all, national labour law and the 
social objectives pursued by a collective agreement once again had to give way 
to the Treaty freedoms. The balancing test exercised by the Court was, just like 
in the cases of Laval and Viking, highly one-sided, taking the view that it is the 
Treaty freedoms that have priority over social rights and a restriction needs to 
be both justified and proportionate. This approach gives rise to another ques-
tion, namely, why the proportionality assessment always takes the economic per-
spective. Take this case for example, why does not the requirements stemming 
from the public procurement directives need to be justified and proportionate? 
The treaty freedoms and fundamental rights carry the same weight and are to be 
seen as equals, especially since the EU Charter was granted the same legal value 
as the Treaties. Why is this not reflected in the Court’s adjudication?125  
 
Advocate General Trstenjak discusses this question to some extent in her Opin-
ion, and her words seems very promising from a worker protection perspective. 
She recognises the necessity of a more symmetrical approach when reconciling 
conflicting interests in cases where fundamental freedoms and fundamental 
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rights clash. She advocates for an approach where the Treaty freedoms enjoy the 
same legal status as social rights and a proportionality test with a different start-
ing point. In paragraph 190 she states that: 
 
A fair balance between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is ensured 
in the case of a conflict only when the restriction by a fundamental right on a 
fundamental freedom is not permitted to go beyond what is appropriate, neces-
sary and reasonable to realise that fundamental right. Conversely, however, nor 
may the restriction on a fundamental right by a fundamental freedom go beyond 
what is appropriate, necessary and reasonable to realise the fundamental free-
dom.126 
 
This ‘double proportionality test’127 means that just as a restriction of a Treaty 
freedom needs to be proportionate, a restriction of a fundamental right needs to 
be proportionate, even if this means limiting a Treaty freedom.128 The Opinion 
seems thus far promising from a social perspective and has the protection of 
workers in mind. The actual assessment of proportionality does, however, fall 
short since the AG does not conduct such a ‘double proportionality test’ as she 
advocates for in her Opinion. Instead, the AG conducts a proportionality as-
sessment where she examines whether the restriction of the Treaty freedoms is 
‘appropriate and necessary’. She ultimately comes to the same conclusion as the 
Court, namely, that the right to collective bargaining cannot justify the restriction 
on the Treaty freedoms resulting from the German system, since it is not pro-
portionate. Her advocation in favour of a more symmetrical approach is thus 
not shown in the actual assessment of the case.129  
 
Despite the Court’s rather one-sided balancing test and the fact that the AG does 
not follow through on her idea of a ‘double proportionality test’, the judgment 
also contains some promising elements, at least in comparison to previous judg-
ments in cases like Viking and Laval. The reference to a ‘fair balance’ is one 
example, as well as the need for reconciliation of conflicting interests. This could 
mean a possibility for litigants to concentrate on presenting facts that show how 
internal market rules restricts social rights, indicating that the social objectives 
behind a national policy are irreconcilable with the requirements stemming from, 
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for example, a directive implementing the freedom to provide services and/or 
freedom of establishment.130 
 
3.4.2 Santos Palhota and Others 
A few months after the Commission v Germany ruling, the ECJ decided the case of 
Santos Palhota and Others.131 The case concerned the issue of posted workers, as 
discussed in Laval and Viking.  
 
As to the background, the case concerned a Portuguese company posting work-
ers to a shipyard in Belgium. The company had failed to meet some of the obli-
gations stipulated in Belgian law concerning social documents with the objective 
of protecting workers’ rights. On the basis of the freedom to provide services, 
the company challenged the national law by claiming infringement of their 
rights.132 The Court of Justice had to decide on two specific obligations, namely, 
the obligation for employers to send a prior declaration of posting to the Belgian 
authorities and also the obligation to keep documents that are comparable with 
the Belgian individual accounts or pay slips.133  
 
The Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón is particularly relevant due to 
his call for a Union that lives up to the normative social commitments made by 
the EU. In the Opinion, the AG started by stressing that the case of Santos Palhota 
and Others ‘brings to light once again the inherent tension between the construc-
tion of the internal market and the protection of social values’.134 He then reit-
erated the premises of EU internal market law, namely, that ‘The Court […] uses 
a broad definition of ‘restriction’ in relation to freedom to provide services, rang-
ing from the actual prohibition of an activity to merely reducing its appeal.’135 In 
terms of justification on the basis of overriding requirements relating to the pub-
lic interests, in this case protection of workers, he stated that such a justification 
must be strictly interpreted as well as proportionate.136 In the following para-
graph, the AG addressed the Treaty of Lisbon and presented a reasoning that 
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was rather unique and promising from a social perspective. He stated that since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty five months earlier, it is ‘necessary to 
take into account a number of provisions of primary social law which affect the 
framework of the fundamental freedoms.’137 He explicitly referred to Article 9 
TFEU, describing it as a ‘”cross-cutting” social protection clause’ and then 
turned to the Union’s objectives as stated in Article 3(3) TEU, emphasising that 
‘the construction of the internal market is to be realised by means of policies 
based on “a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employ-
ment and social progress”’.138 In the following paragraph, the AG stated that this 
‘social obligation’ can also be found when looking at the EU Charter and more 
specifically, Article 31 of the Charter. This provision provides that ‘[e]very 
worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety 
and dignity.’139 The AG’s criticism and advocation for a fairer balance between 
the Treaty freedoms and social values followed, and in paragraph 53 he pre-
sented his thoughts on the issue: 
 
As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, when working condi-
tions constitute an overriding reason relating to the public interest justifying a 
derogation from the freedom to provide services, they must no longer be inter-
preted strictly. In so far as the protection of workers is a matter which warrants 
protection under the Treaties themselves, it is not a simple derogation from a 
freedom, still less an unwritten exception inferred from case-law. To the extent 
that the new primary law framework provides for a mandatory high level of social 
protection, it authorises the Member States, for the purpose of safeguarding a 
certain level of social protection, to restrict a freedom, and to do so without Eu-
ropean Union law’s regarding it as something exceptional and, therefore, as war-
ranting a strict interpretation. That view, which is founded on the new provisions 
of the Treaties cited above, is expressed in practical terms by applying the prin-
ciple of proportionality.140 
 
In other words, AG Cruz Villalón argues that the protection of workers no 
longer constitutes a derogation to the Treaty freedoms due to the social, norma-
tive commitments made by the EU in the Treaty of Lisbon. This social obliga-
tion has, according to the AG, fundamentally altered the premises of EU free 
movement and internal market law.  
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However, the Court of Justice mentioned neither the social provisions intro-
duced by the Treaty of Lisbon nor did it address the question of whether these 
provisions have resulted in changes to the construction of primary law. The 
Court instead applied the traditional approach where it found that the obliga-
tions in the Belgian law constituted a restriction to the freedom to provide ser-
vices, which might be justifiable on the basis of worker protection if it is shown 
to be proportionate. The Court ultimately found that the obligation to send a 
prior declaration of posting went beyond what was necessary and was therefore 
not justified. The obligation to keep certain social documents, comparable to 
documents required in Belgium, available for the authorities and to send these 
at the end of a posting was seen as proportionate and hence, a justified re-
striction.141  
 
Even though the Court did not follow the Advocate General’s proposal, I be-
lieve that the AG’s Opinion could function as a trajectory for future changes of 
the EU legal order. He showed that there is an alternative and a more balanced 
way of adjudicating cases in which worker protection and Treaty freedoms con-
flict. Professor Stephen Weatherill argues that ‘[there] are aspects of the Lisbon 
Treaty that serve to strengthen the argument that free movement law must be 
more attentive to (in short) non-economic objectives’. 142 However, he also states 
that ‘[t]he Lisbon Treaty does not make a qualitative change to the structure and 
scope of the law governing free movement’,143 indicating that we cannot auto-
matically expect that a change of primary law, i.e. a treaty reform, will change the 
fundamental premises of internal market and free movement law.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Court cannot, if it really wants to, 
change its approach and management of cases where interests of the European 
integration project clash with, for example, worker protection. Professor Jukka 
Snell emphasise this by stating that ‘[t]he balance between the differing interests 
is not set in the Treaty, but needs to be established in political and judicial are-
nas’.144 This shows what an important role the Court has in the strive towards a 
‘Social Europe’, especially considering the difficulties in reaching consensus 
among the Member States due their diversity and deviating opinions regarding 
social matters. 
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3.4.3 Alemo-Herron and Others  
In 2013, the Court decided the case of Alemo-Herron and Others.145 Criticism soon 
followed due to the Court’s lack of regard for the social protection of workers. 
However, in this case it was not a fundamental freedom that prevailed, but a 
fundamental right. Namely, the freedom to conduct business in Article 16 of the 
EU Charter.146 
 
The underlying dispute concerned dynamic clauses in employment contracts re-
ferring to collective agreements, and whether they were compatible with the ‘Ac-
quired Rights Directive’,147 ‘relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in 
the event of transfers of undertakings […]’.148 Alemo-Herron and his work col-
leagues were employed in the leisure department at the Lewisham London Bor-
ough Council, i.e. the public sector, when the department was contracted out to 
a private company and later sold to Parkwood, another private undertaking. A 
dynamic clause was contained in the employment contracts of the employees, 
stating: 
 
During your employment with [Lewisham], your terms and conditions of em-
ployment will be in accordance with collective agreements negotiated from time 
to time by the [NJC] ..., supplemented by agreements reached locally through 
[Lewisham]’s negotiating committees.149 
 
This contractual term thus granted Alemo-Herron and his colleagues the terms 
and conditions stipulated in the collective agreement negotiated by the NJC, the 
local government collective bargaining body. After Parkwood acquired the lei-
sure department, negotiations with the NJC resulted in a pay increase. Due to 
Parkwood being a private undertaking, it did not participate (or had the possi-
bility of participating) in the negotiations. Parkwood therefore claimed that the 
newly negotiated terms, granting an increase in pay, was not binding upon them 
and refused to pay the increased salary. Consequently, Alemo-Herron and his 
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colleagues brought proceedings against Parkwood in order to get the Court to 
recognise the increase in salary.150  
 
The question for the national court to decide was how the abovementioned con-
tractual term should be interpreted. Parkwood argued for a ‘static interpretation’ 
of the clause, which incorporates the collective agreement in force at the time of 
the transfer, whereas Alemo-Herron and his colleagues argued for a ‘dynamic 
interpretation’, incorporating also future collective agreements as negotiated by 
the NJC. The national court ultimately found that the contractual term consti-
tuted a dynamic clause. 
 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive harmonised certain aspects of transfers of 
undertakings on the basis of worker protection, an interpretation by the ECJ was 
subsequently necessary when the national court was uncertain if dynamic clauses 
were compatible with the Directive. In the case of Werhof,151 the ECJ had pro-
vided an interpretation of Article 3(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive, which 
stated that employer’s rights should be transferred to the new employer at the 
event of a transfer. In Werhof, the Court found that Article 3(1) does not preclude 
the transferee from not being bound by dynamic clauses. In other words, the 
Directive does not require the new employer to be bound by a dynamic clause, 
thus, allowing for a static interpretation per se. The ambiguity of the Werhof rul-
ing led to diverging opinions of its meaning, which ultimately resulted in the 
dispute between Alemo-Herron, his colleagues and Parkwood.152  
 
Since the Acquired Rights Directive was a minimum harmonisation directive and 
thus, allowed Member States to introduce higher levels of protection153 and had 
the objective ‘to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a change 
of employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded’,154 the log-
ical answer would be that the Directive allows dynamic clauses. Nevertheless, 
the ECJ found that dynamic clauses were incompatible with the Acquired Rights 
Directive and based this conclusion on two things. Firstly, dynamic clauses 
would undermine the fair balance between competing interests which the Di-
rective aimed to achieve. Secondly, dynamic clauses would ‘adversely affect the 
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very essence of the transferee’s freedom to conduct a business’155 since an un-
dertaking, such as Parkwood, was not able to participate in the negotiations.  
 
The case of Alemo-Herron and Others contains several interesting aspects that have 
been discussed extensively by legal scholars. Such critical analysis usually re-
volves around three components of the Court’s reasoning, which Professor Ma-
rija Bartl and Candida Leone summarised well in their research paper: 
 
1) reinterpreting the Directive’s telos, in order to overcome the “employee in-
terest” clause; 
2) down-playing the relevance of the Directive’s minimum harmonisation ap-
proach by reference to the Charter; 
3) introducing a normative standard – the freedom to conduct business and, 
with it, freedom of contract.156  
 
These three steps can be deduced from the Court’s reasoning in Alemo-Herron 
and provide a clear example of the Court’s approach towards the relationship 
between the internal market and the protection of workers. In the following, I 
will analyse the case on the basis of these three components in order to shed 
some light on why the case of Alemo-Herron is problematic from a worker pro-
tection perspective.  
 
3.4.3.1 Fair balance  
The first step of the Court’s reasoning concentrated on reinterpreting the objec-
tive of the Acquired Rights Directive to better fit the Court’s desired outcome. 
As stated above, the Directive was aiming at safeguarding the rights of employ-
ees in the event of a transfer and the rationale was consequently to function as 
a counterweight by ensuring a minimum level of worker protection.157 However, 
the Court presented an alternative objective and argued that: 
 
Directive 77/187 does not aim solely to safeguard the interests of employees in 
the event of transfer of an undertaking, but seeks to ensure a fair balance between 
the interests of those employees, on the one hand, and those of the transferee, 
on the other. More particularly, it makes clear that the transferee must be in a 
position to make the adjustments and changes necessary to carry on its opera-
tions.158 
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By this statement, the Court changed the perception of what the Directive’s ob-
jective entailed. Bartl and Leone states that the result of this reinterpretation was 
that ‘the balance should no longer be struck on a structural level, where legisla-
tion tries to offset certain socio-economic changes, but within the Directive it-
self’159 and hence, between employees and employers. The Court argued that 
‘[s]ince the transfer is of an undertaking from the public sector to the private 
sector, the continuation of the transferee’s operations will require significant ad-
justments and changes, given the inevitable differences in working conditions 
that exist between those two sectors.’160 This was used to legitimise the Court’s 
finding that dynamic clauses undermined the fair balance between the employer 
and the employees.    
 
As stated above, the Directive harmonised rules on worker protection in a spe-
cific situation and the objective was thus to protect the rights of such workers. 
By using the notion of a ‘fair balance’ as an interpretative basis, the Court disre-
garded this objective and chose to safeguard the contractual freedom of the em-
ployer at the expense of workers. Professor Stephen Weatherill’s case note de-
scribes the doings of the Court by stating that ‘[i]t is a radical twisting of the 
rationales behind the EU’s intervention. It priorities the flexibility of employers 
in a situation where what is plainly at stake is precisely damage to the interests 
of employees.’161 Furthermore, Weatherill argues that the Court, by ‘[c]laiming 
to pursue a fair balance but not articulating what weightings apply on that bal-
ance where employee and employer interests collide, it has in fact preferred a 
distinctively pro-employer interpretation of an ambiguous text’.162  
  
Notwithstanding the inaccuracy of reinterpreting the objective of the Directive, 
the search for a ‘fair balance’ sounds like a promising standard from a worker 
protection perspective. Especially considering previous cases in which the Court 
prioritised interests of the European integration project over social values and 
rights.163 However, when the Court decided the case of Alemo-Herron, it paid no 
regard to the interests of the employers. Instead it focused on safeguarding the 
private company’s contractual freedom and provided a ruling that demonstrates, 
what I believe to be, nothing but a fair balance.  
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3.4.3.2 Minimum harmonisation  
The second step of the Court’s reasoning is connected to a discussion about the 
meaning and effects of minimum harmonisation. The case of Alemo-Herron iden-
tifies a constitutional issue, namely, whether national measures going beyond the 
minimum level of a directive should be considered to fall within the scope of 
EU law, in particular, the EU Charter?164  
 
The ECJ believed that the answer to this question was affirmative and conse-
quently assessed the national measure’s compatibility with fundamental rights, 
more specifically, the freedom to conduct business.165 This line of action was 
questionable since a fundamental rights violation not automatically brings a 
question within the scope of EU law, in contrast to a violation of the Treaty 
freedoms.166   
 
Bartl and Leone discuss this aspect of the ruling in their article and emphasise 
the peculiarity of conducting a fundamental rights review of protective measures 
adopted within the Member States’ area of legislative discretion, i.e. above the 
EU minimum level. This entails that such measures would fall within the scope 
of EU law, an assertion which the Court did not substantiate further in the 
Alemo-Herron ruling. However, what is clear is that when a Member State intro-
duces protective measures above the minimum level of a EU directive, such pol-
icies might fall within the scope of EU law and accordingly, within reach of the 
ECJ. According to Bartl and Leone, this constitutes an expansion of the ECJ’s 
competence in regard to fundamental rights review, at the expense of national 
autonomy and the legitimacy of minimum harmonisation as a legal instrument.167  
 
3.4.3.3 Freedom to conduct business 
The final step of the Court’s reasoning relates to the normative standard used in 
their fundamental rights review. The Court started by stating that an interpreta-
tion of the Acquired Rights Directive must be in compliance with the funda-
mental rights of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this case, the right 
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to conduct business, incorporating the freedom of contract, which can be found 
in Article 16 of the EU Charter.168  
 
In its judgment, the Court presented what it believed to be the ‘essence’ of the 
right to conduct business. The Court argued that ‘the transferee must be able to 
assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to 
negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its em-
ployees with a view to its future economic activity’.169 Since Parkwood was not 
able to partake in the collective bargaining process, the right would be ‘seriously 
reduced to the point that such a limitation is liable to adversely affect the very 
essence of its freedom to conduct a business’170 if EU law allowed dynamic 
clauses to be enforceable. This assertion becomes more interesting when com-
pared to the Advocate General Cruz Villalón’s Opinion, which contradicts the 
Court’s ruling in this aspect. He stated that the Court’s case law has not elabo-
rated on the actual content of the freedom to conduct business and concluded 
that ‘the freedom to conduct a business protects economic initiative and the 
ability to participate in a market, rather than the actual profit, seen in financial 
terms, that is earned in that market’.171  
 
From a worker protection perspective, this ruling is not only problematic in re-
spect of its outcome, i.e. the unenforceability of dynamic clauses against a new 
employer after a transfer, but also how the Court came to this conclusion. The 
Court did not examine whether there are other interests and rights that could 
potentially function as a justification of the limitation of the employer’s freedom 
to conduct business. The value of protecting the rights of workers, such as 
Alemo-Herron and his colleagues, was overlooked which consequently made it 
possible for the Court to reach its conclusion. In addition, the Court did not 
conduct a balancing exercise where it weighed different interests against each 
other, nor did it apply a test of proportionality. Thus, the Court did not utilise 
any of the available tools that the Court is supposed to use in its legal reasoning 
when doing a fundamental rights review.172 
 
Furthermore, the judgment in the case of Alemo-Herron suggests that a funda-
mental rights review does not automatically lead to socially sensitive outcomes. 
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The reconceptualisation of capitalist principles as fundamental rights becomes a 
powerful tool to promote freedom of contract and safeguard private parties’ 
commercial freedom and flexibility, at the expense of worker protection.173 
Weatherill argues that: 
 
Alemo-Herron […] stands not for a ‘social softening’ of EU law nor even for 
(my preferred interpretation) a re-affirmation of pre-existing patterns of sensitive 
‘balancing’. Instead, and in quite the opposite direction, it stands for a newly en-
ergised deregulatory thrust driven by Article 16 of the Charter.174 
 
According to Weatherill, inherent in the Alemo-Herron ruling is a legitimate legal 
basis for striking down social regulations protecting workers at the national level 
and thus, to pursue further deregulation which is in the interest of the internal 
market.  
 
3.4.4 Elektrobudowa 
In 2015, the Court decided the case of Elektrobudowa175 and yet again provided 
an interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive. The case concerned Polish 
workers posted to Finland, who had not received the minimum wage as estab-
lished by relevant collective agreement. The workers subsequently assigned their 
wage claims to the trade union in Finland in order to recover the amount that 
they believed to have the right to. The Polish company disagreed and argued 
that the action should be dismissed based on a prohibition of the assignment of 
wage claims, pursuant to Polish law. The case eventually reached the Court of 
Justice to which the national court asked for guidance of what the employer 
could be obliged to pay their workers.176  
 
The Court of Justice found that the posted workers could assign their wage 
claims to a trade union in the host country, if the law of that country allowed 
this, notwithstanding the legality of such an action in the sending country. The 
ECJ thus allowed Finnish trade unions to get involved in order to safeguard the 
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interests of posted workers.177 The Court’s decision was consequently beneficial 
for the Polish workers and the protection of them.  
 
Another positive aspect from a worker protection perspective was the interpre-
tation of Article 3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive. In its ruling, the Court 
clarified that Article 3(1) of the Directive clearly stipulates that the meaning of 
the concept of ‘minimum rates of pay’ is governed by the law of the host State, 
i.e. Finland, even if the employment relationship in other cases is governed by 
the law of the sending State.178 In addition to this, the ECJ had to decide whether 
certain elements of pay, as prescribed by Finnish collective agreements, could 
constitute ‘minimum pay’. The Court gave a broad interpretation of what could 
be included in the notion of ‘minimum pay’ and found that host States could, 
when calculating the minimum wage, categorise workers into pay groups on the 
basis of experience, qualifications, relevant training and what type of work it 
concerned. The Court also held that the ‘minimum wage’ includes a daily allow-
ance and compensation for daily travelling time. Accommodation costs and meal 
vouchers were not regarded to fall within the ‘minimum wage’, but should not 
to be subtracted from it either.179  
 
The judgment in the case of Elektrobudowa has been considered to reflect an im-
portant change in the Court’s previously criticised approach towards national 
labour regimes. In contrast to the case of Laval, the Finnish trade union received 
the Court’s full support in respect of its involvement.180 However, when one 
examines the reasoning of the Court, and in particular the Opinion of Advocate 
General Wahl, the alleged shift in approach becomes questionable. This is best 
shown by reference to AG Wahl’s obiter dictum in respect of the Finnish system, 
which was not the subject matter of the proceedings. He stated that: 
  
[…] a system such as the Finnish one in which (domestic) undertakings may ‘cir-
cumvent’ the applicability of the universally applicable collective agreement by 
concluding another — possibly more specific and even, in some cases, less fa-
vourable to the workers — collective agreement does not seem to be entirely 
unproblematic from the perspective of the provision of services across national 
borders.181 
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This statement shows that the protection of fair competition between foreign 
and domestic undertakings was the fundamental concern at issue here, similarly 
to the case of Laval. Consequently, it is questionable whether the Court has 
changed its underlying rationale and approach in cases where the protection of 
workers conflict with the interests of the European integration project. 
 
Despite this, the Court’s ruling in the case of Elektrobudowa demonstrates ‘great 
consideration for the social dimension of the issue’182, as stated by Pieter Peci-
novsky, and indicates a softened stance towards protective labour standards at 
the national level which should not be disparaged. 
 
3.4.5 Regiopost 
In the end of 2015, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in RegioPost.183 
The case concerned public procurement and the enforceability of national labour 
standards in cross-border situations.  
 
The town of Landau, Germany, had put out a call for tenders at the European 
level regarding a public contract connected to postal services. In the contract 
notice it was stated that a tender needed to comply with Article 3 of the regional 
law (‘the regional provision’) to be eligible for the contract award.184 The regional 
provision stipulated that ‘public contracts may be awarded only to undertakings 
which, at the time of submitting their tender, undertake in writing to pay their 
staff, for performing the service, wages of at least EUR 8.50 gross per hour 
(minimum wage) […]’.185 If such a written declaration was not submitted, the 
tender would be excluded from the selection process. At the time of the pro-
ceedings, there was no general law or collective agreement in Germany that de-
termined the mandatory minimum wage for the workers. 
 
In the present dispute, RegioPost had failed to submit a written declaration and 
was consequently excluded.186 RegioPost challenged this decision and claimed 
that the obligation infringed on their freedom to provide services. The German 
court submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, asking 
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whether the regional provision was in conformity with EU law. Specifically, Ar-
ticle 26 of Directive 2004/18, which granted Member States the possibility to 
‘lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a contract, provided 
that these are compatible with Community law’.187  
 
Thus, the Court of Justice had to assess whether the regional provision was 
‘compatible with Community law’ and, in particular, Article 56 TFEU (freedom 
to provide services) and Article 3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive. Article 
3(1) provided that host countries need to ensure that companies guarantee their 
workers the terms and conditions of employment in respect of certain matters, 
which are laid down by ‘law, regulation or administrative provision’ and/or ‘col-
lective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable’ in the host state. ‘The minimum rates of pay’ constituted one of these 
matters.188 
 
The ECJ found that the regional provision constituted a ‘law’ that stipulated ‘a 
minimum rate of pay’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Posted Workers 
Directive. This interpretation was, according to the Court, in line with the free-
dom to provide services. The ECJ also clarified that even though a wage require-
ment can constitute a restriction to the Treaty freedoms, the objective of pro-
tecting workers can function as a justification.189 The wage requirement in the 
regional provision was thus in conformity with EU law.190  
 
When providing arguments to support its finding, the Court made several refer-
ences to Rüffert. Since the Court had reached a different conclusion in Rüffert, i.e. 
the wage requirement had not been compatible with EU law, it focused on em-
phasising the differences between the cases in order to justify its decision and 
avoid changing its stance. In respect of this, the Court stated: 
 
[…] [A]lthough the Court concluded, in the context of the examination of the 
national measure at issue in the case that gave rise to that judgment in the light 
of Article 56 TFEU, that that measure could not be justified by the objective of 
the protection of workers, it based that conclusion on certain characteristics specific 
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to that measure, which clearly distinguish that measure from the national measure 
at issue in the main proceedings.191 
 
In Rüffert, the wage requirement was laid down in a sectoral collective agreement 
that only applied to the construction sector and public contracts. It had not been 
declared universally applicable and exceeded the minimum pay stipulated by law. 
Thus, it constituted an unjustified restriction to the freedom to provide services. 
In RegioPost, the wage requirement was provided for in a regional law, it was 
generally applicable to public contracts in the specific region and there was no 
general law or collective agreement that determined the mandatory minimum 
wage.192 
 
It has been argued that the ruling in RegioPost reflects a shift in the Court’s pre-
viously restrictive approach towards national measures that could restrict the 
interests of the European integration project, i.e. the Treaty freedoms.193 In Re-
gioPost, the Court reiterated that the protection of workers constitutes a possible 
justification but since the wage requirement only applied to public contracts, it 
was reasonable to think that the Court would come to the same conclusion as in 
Rüffert, i.e. that this requirement was not effective to protect workers. However, 
the ECJ stated that it did not matter that the obligation to pay a minimum wage 
was only applicable to public contracts, since the condition of universal applica-
tion was only relevant when wage requirements are laid down in collective agree-
ments, as stated in Article 3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive.194 Consequently, 
the assertion that a wage requirement was not an effective measure to protect 
workers because it was only applicable to the public sector, as argued by the 
Court in Rüffert, was not used in the case of RegioPost.  
 
This observation indicates that the Court has adjusted its restrictive approach as 
established in Rüffert. Professor Anne Davies argues that the ruling in RegioPost 
‘suggests some, albeit rather limited, softening in the Court’s approach towards 
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social justifications for infringements of the free movement rules’.195 This is sup-
ported by Professor Sacha Garben who states that ‘‘even if the extent to which 
Laval, Rüffert, Luxembourg […] have been overturned is open to discussion, 
the permissive signal to Member States and their courts is a strong one’.196 How-
ever, as both Davies and Garben implies, the Court’s ruling should not be ex-
pected to fundamentally change the Court’s restrictive approach towards na-
tional labour standards, as established in its case law. Especially considering the 
fact that the case of RegioPost concerned a minimum wage requirement laid down 
in a regional law. Consequently, the ruling of Rüffert is still relevant, at least in 
respect of the legal effects of collective agreements in a situation concerning 
posted workers. 
 
3.4.6 AGET Iraklis  
The judgement in AGET Iraklis197 was delivered in the end of 2016 and con-
cerned Greek legislation with a worker protection objective in the context of 
collective redundancies.  
 
The disputed law required employers to reach an agreement with representatives 
of the workers or to receive authorisation from the competent authority before 
a collective redundancy, i.e. dismissing several employees.198 AGET Iraklis, a 
Greek company, planned collective redundancies and since it had not reach an 
agreement with the workers’ representatives it submitted a request for authori-
sation from the relevant authority. When the request was denied on the basis of 
it being insufficiently justified, AGET Iraklis launched an action for annulment 
of that decision. 
 
The ECJ was subsequently asked to examine whether the national measure, re-
quiring authorisation by the competent authority in the absence of an agreement 
with the representatives of the workers, complied with EU law. The Court 
started out by interpreting Directive 98/59199 and concluded that Member States 
                                                
195 DAVIES (2018), ‘How has the Court of Justice changed its management and approach to-
wards the social acquis?’, p. 166. 
196 GARBEN (2017), ‘The Constitutional (Im)balance between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in 
the European Union’, pp. 39-40. 
197 C-201/15, Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koi-
nonikis Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 De-
cember 2016, EU:C:2016:972. 
198 C-201/15, AGET Iraklis, para. 24. 
199 Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies. 
 46 
have the possibility of adopting protective legislation, such as the legislation at 
issue in the proceedings, since the Directive only partially harmonise the situa-
tion of projected collective redundancies. However, such national rules may not 
deprive the Directive, in particular Articles 2 through 4, of their ‘practical ef-
fect’.200 This would be the case if ‘any actual possibility for the employer to effect 
such collective redundancies were, in practice, ruled out’ by the Greek legisla-
tion.201 Consequently, Directive 98/59 did not preclude protective legislation like 
the one at issue in the proceedings, provided that it did not deprive the Di-
rective’s provisions of their practical effect.202 
 
The Court of Justice then turned to the question of whether the national legis-
lation restricted the freedom of establishment, as claimed by AGET Iraklis. It 
provided a description of what the exercise of the freedom of establishment 
entailed, stating that: 
 
[T]he freedom to determine the nature and extent of the economic activity that 
will be carried out in the host Member State, in particular the size of the fixed 
establishments and the number of workers required for that purpose, and also 
[…] the freedom subsequently to scale down that activity or even the freedom to 
give up, should it so decide, its activity and establishment.203 
 
After considering the Greek legislation’s restrictiveness the ECJ concluded that 
it constituted a ‘serious obstacle to the exercise of freedom of establishment in 
Greece’.204 
 
Nevertheless, a national regime can be allowed if it is justifiable, i.e. ‘justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest’205 and proportionate, i.e. ‘appropriate for 
ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain that objective’.206 In respect of the legislation’s justifiability, 
the Court emphasised that the objective of protecting workers is a possible 
ground for justification.207 An uncommon but beneficial reasoning followed 
where the ECJ made several explicit references to the social provisions of the 
Treaty. It highlighted the social objectives enshrined in Article 3(3) TEU and 
stressed that the EU has a twofold purpose. An economic purpose focused on 
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establishing an internal market and a social purpose with the aim to secure a 
sustainable development of the Union and Europe at large.208 The Court contin-
ued to state that this twofold purpose entails that the Treaty freedoms have to 
be balanced against the social objectives209 and underlying social policy 
measures.210 The Court also emphasised that the EU has an obligation to ‘con-
tribute to a high level of employment’ and that this objective needs to be con-
sidered when formulating and implementing the EU’s policies and activities, as 
provided in Article 147 TFEU. In addition, the ECJ referred to the horizontal 
social clause in Article 9 TFEU, which requires the EU to consider social issues 
such as the ‘promotion of a high level of employment’ and ‘guarantee of ade-
quate social protection’ when defining and implementing its policies and activi-
ties. 211 
 
Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a justification must comply with funda-
mental rights enshrined in the EU Charter. In this case, the relevant right was 
the freedom to conduct a business.212 The Court held that the Greek legislation 
constituted a ‘interference in the exercise of the freedom to conduct business 
and, in particular, the freedom of contract’.213 However, limitations can be ac-
cepted if it is ‘provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and free-
doms and, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’,214 as provided in Article 
52(1) of the EU Charter. The Court made a reference to Article 30 in which it is 
stated that ‘[e]very worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal 
the right to protection’.215  
 
The Court then proceeded to the question of proportionality and whether the 
national legislation was justified, despite its restrictive effect to the freedom of 
establishment and freedom to conduct business. In respect of this, the Court 
emphasised that the national legislation must ‘seek to reconcile and to strike a 
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fair balance’ between the protection of workers and the employer’s right to free-
dom of establishment and freedom to conduct a business.216 The Court ulti-
mately found that the Greek legislation was not justified due to a lack of propor-
tionality and thus infringed Article 49 TFEU and Article 16 of the EU Charter.217 
The Court based this conclusion primarily on the fact that the legal criteria in 
the Greek legislation used by the authority to oppose collective redundancies 
was to imprecise and general.218  
 
As discussed above, the ruling in Alemo-Herron generated a discussion about the 
Court’s libertarian adjudication and disregard of the protection of workers. In 
Alemo-Herron, it seemed like the Court was willing to do anything in its power to 
secure the employer’s commercial freedom. This is why the advocates of ‘Social 
Europe’ was hoping for a revised approach reflecting a more socially sensitive 
Court in AGET Iraklis. Whether the Court struck a fairer balance in AGET 
Iraklis is up for discussion. 219 In comparison to Alemo-Herron, the judgment has 
been considered to show a significant higher level of fairness. Due to, inter alia, 
the Court’s conclusion that the Greek legislation did not affect the essence of 
the freedom to conduct business, contrary to its finding in Alemo-Herron.220 It 
also recognised that the Greek labour regime could in principle be regarded as a 
proportionate measure and thus, comply with the freedom of establishment and 
freedom to conduct business.221 
 
According to Professor Stefano Giubboni, the ruling of AGET Iraklis demon-
strates how national labour standards can be used to access the market, as well 
as a judicial tool to safeguard the commercial freedom and undisrupted activity 
of employers within that market.222 To strike down national labour regimes using 
a Treaty freedom is far from novel. However, to interpret this freedom in light 
of the freedom to conduct business has been considered a new and innovative 
tool used by the Court to scrutinise any measure that constitute an obstacle to 
employers’ contractual freedom. By conducting a fundamental rights review, the 
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Court try to reconceptualise their underlying economic objective in order to le-
gitimise its decisions.223  
 
Nevertheless, AGET Iraklis is not all bad news for Social Europe. The ECJ em-
phasised that the Union, in addition to an economic purpose, has a social pur-
pose and made several explicit references to the social provisions of the Treaties. 
This is very rare and should not be neglected. However, Professor Dagmar 
Schiek stresses that the references to social policy objectives in the judgment 
loses any potential impact since they are not connected to their ‘fundamental 
rights basis’, which leaves the superiority of Article 16 of the EU Charter un-
questioned.224 The Court did refer to Article 30 of the EU Charter, enshrining 
the right to protection in the event of unjustified dismissal, but stopped at a mere 
reference. Despite this, it indicates that the Court tried to consider whether there 
were other rights at stake. An element clearly lacking in Alemo-Herron.225 
  
Furthermore, the Court left it to the national court to decide whether the Greek 
legislation would deprive the Directive of its practical effect, which is beneficial 
since social concerns are often better examined on the national level. The court 
also recognised that the Member States have a ‘broad discretion when choosing 
the measures capable of achieving the aims of their social policy’,226 a positive 
acknowledgement granting Member States some leeway when formulating their 
policies. The Court’s finding that the Greek legislation was too imprecise and 
general should not receive significant criticism since the intelligibility of legal 
criteria is important from the perspective of ensuring legal certainty. The Court 
also applied a less strict test of proportionality, in comparison to AG Wahl who 
also questioned the Greek legislation’s appropriateness. Lastly, the judgment in 
AGET Iraklis does not prohibit Greece and other Member States to adopt a 
similar system, compatible with EU law.227   
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4 The rise or demise of    
‘Social Europe’  
4.1 Introduction 
Ever since 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed, the European integration 
project’s primary objective has been to establish a common market. Conse-
quently, libertarian values such as commercial freedom, free trade, undistorted 
competition and freedom of movement was given a superior position in the 
EU’s constitutional foundation in order to facilitate economic integration.228 In 
recent years, we have witnessed an increasing criticism of the EU, both in respect 
of the interests it represents and the policies it produces. The criticism revolves 
around the claim that the Union suffers from a ‘social deficit’ with an apparent 
disregard for social concerns and a disruptive effect on national regimes in the 
domains of employment and social policy. From this criticism, a call for an im-
proved and more social Europe has emerged and the notion of ‘Social Europe’ 
has since then guided the EU in its endeavour to reorient the European integra-
tion project. One of the main underlying reasons behind the EU’s ‘social deficit’ 
is the inherent tension between social values, such as worker protection, and the 
interests of the European integration project. On account of this, the EU has 
made several normative commitments to guarantee that the Union moves be-
yond economic integration and also respects and promotes social values. Such 
commitments are primarily made through the Treaty of Lisbon.229  
 
The inherent tension between the interests of the European integration project 
and the EU’s social aspirations give rise to disputes which need to be resolved 
through adjudication. Professor Jukka Snell states that ‘‘[t]he balance between 
the differing interests is not set in the Treaty, but needs to be established in 
political and judicial arenas’.230 Thus, it is up to the Court of Justice to interpret 
EU law and strike a balance between conflicting interests. 
 
In the following section, I intend to reiterate some of my conclusions from the 
case law study conducted in the previous chapter. By doing this, I will be able to 
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analyse if the Court’s approach has shifted due to the introduction of social pro-
visions in the Lisbon Treaty and ultimately answer my second research question. 
Namely, Does the Court of Justice’s adjudication reflect a commitment towards the realisation 
of ‘Social Europe’?  
 
4.2 Pre-Lisbon 
The legitimacy of the European Union depends on the social compromise 
agreed upon in the early days of the European integration project. Embodied in 
this compromise is the idea that national labour systems and its protective func-
tions should not be affected by the Union’s market building efforts. This com-
promise constitutes a crucial component in the constitutional framework of the 
Union and was necessary in order to turn the dreams of a united and prosperous 
Europe into reality.231  
 
By applying a particular sense of caution in cases where national labour standards 
conflicted with interests of the European integration project, the social compro-
mise was respected by the Court of Justice for many years. The Court focused 
on ensuring undistorted competition and freedom of movement but made sure 
to avoid any unnecessary disruption of labour systems at the national level. By 
applying this method of adjudication, the Court managed to tear down national 
barriers and promote the interests of the European integration project without 
upsetting the initial social compromise. Cases like Rush Portuguesa and Albany are 
good examples of the Court’s delicate balancing act in its early case law.232 
 
The balance struck in Rush Portuguesa indicates that the Court was careful not to 
upset the social compromise and dedicated to finding an outcome that preserves 
the autonomy of the Member States and the protection of workers while, at the 
same time, safeguarding the undertaking’s freedom to provide services. This was 
accomplished by allowing the host country to extend its protective labour stand-
ards to workers posted to their territory but precluding the country to restrict 
the undertaking’s possibility to take on a contract in that Member State. Same 
goes for Albany, in which collective agreements were excluded from the scope 
of a Treaty provision regulating competition. However, the Court also made 
clear that the provisions regulating abuse of dominant position still applied and 
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that the pension fund needed to comply with these rules.233 Once again, the 
Court struck a balance between competing interests which I believe to be rea-
sonable and that reflect a socially sensitive Court. 
 
In 2007 and 2008, the Court’s approach towards the relationship between the 
interests of the European integration project and worker protection shifted. The 
judgments in Laval, Viking, Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg, also referred to 
as the ‘Laval quartet’,234 reflect a Court that was prone to protect the supremacy 
of the Treaty freedoms, at the expense of national labour regimes and social 
rights.235 
 
Legal scholars have discussed and criticised these cases extensively and their 
opinions often coincide in terms of the Court’s market-friendly approach. One 
may argue that these cases reflect a Court that was biased in favour of the com-
mercial freedom of undertakings, to the detriment of workers’ rights. This asser-
tion is often explained by reference to certain elements of Laval and Viking. 
Namely, the application of the Treaty freedoms in horizontal situations, i.e. be-
tween trade unions and foreign undertakings, the broad interpretation of what 
could constitute a restriction to the Treaty freedoms and the superiority of these 
freedoms over the right to take collective action.236 
 
The right of collective action was recognised as a fundamental right in the EU 
legal order in both Laval and Viking, an acknowledgement that should not be 
disregarded. However, it has been argued that despite this recognition, the social 
right lacks teeth and was merely a rhetorical move by the Court to ensure that it 
is exercised in accordance with EU law.237 In respect of this, Professor Azoulai 
states that: 
 
Recognition of the right to strike implies, in principle, conferring on collective 
actions a certain judicial immunity. On the contrary, power implies control. And it 
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involves the responsibility to take account of the interests of the undertakings 
and those of workers from other Member States.238 
 
Despite the recognition of the right to take collective action as a fundamental 
right, the Court clarified that this right needs to be examined in light of the 
Treaty freedoms. The Court subsequently found that the action in the present 
case constituted a restriction to the Treaty freedoms and thus, needed to be both 
justifiable and proportionate in order to be lawful.239 The consequences of this 
is, to put it in plain language, that workers who want to engage in collective 
action must justify their ‘infringement’ of the economic freedom of employers 
as guaranteed by the Treaty freedoms, by showing that it is an appropriate line 
of action, which does not go beyond what is necessary to protect the interests 
of workers.240 Consequently, collective action is to be regarded as an action of 
last resort. When considering the fact that the power of using collective action 
in a bargaining situation depends on the potential economic loss that such action 
may cause the employer, it becomes clear that the Court chose to guarantee the 
employer’s economic freedom by reinforcing the superiority of the Treaty free-
doms, at the expense of worker protection.241 Furthermore, the Court empha-
sised the need to strike a balance between the Treaty freedoms and worker pro-
tection, since the Union has ‘not only an economic but also a social purpose’.242 
However, when the Court actually struck that balance, it left only a small margin 
of appreciation for the trade unions to justify their collective actions.243 
 
In Rüffert, the Court found that a wage requirement, established by a collective 
agreement, could not be imposed on an undertaking since it did not apply uni-
versally and thus, was not necessary to protect workers.244 The rejection of the 
worker protection justification and the reasoning behind it has been widely crit-
icised.245 It reflects an approach that is sceptical towards applying national labour 
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standards, such as obligations with the objective of worker protection, to cross-
border situations.  
 
Conclusively, the rulings of Laval, Viking and Rüffert can attest to the ECJ’s as-
piration to establish an internal market without obstacles. In respect of this, Pro-
fessor Sacha Garben argues that: 
 
This trilogy of judgments thereby simultaneously widened the already broad def-
inition of potential restrictions on the free movement provisions, seemingly em-
bracing a full ‘market without rules’ approach qualifying all national legislation 
applicable to foreign companies (as well as collective agreements, and collective 
action by workers aimed at procuring such agreements) as prima facie re-
strictions, while also narrowing the scope for justification on social grounds. 
Thereby, the Court fundamentally altered the balance between ‘the economic’ 
and ‘the social’ in the context of the internal market, with real and non-negligible 
consequences.246 
 
Thus, the burden of proof in terms of the justifiability and proportionality of 
national labour systems was ascribed to the state. This particular order is prob-
lematic if the state has no interest in protecting the national regime at dispute. 
In that case, a state could circumvent the democratic process at the national level 
and manage to abolish protective social rules at the European level instead.247  
 
The cases of Laval, Viking and Rüffert were followed by several infringement 
proceedings such as the Commission v Luxembourg. It established that the rulings 
of the ‘Laval quartet’ were the applicable norm for a large number of situations 
within the EU. At least in situations that concerned wage requirements in public 
procurement procedures, imposition of national labour standards to foreign un-
dertakings and collective actions that potentially infringe on undertakings’ eco-
nomic freedom in cross-border situations.  
 
4.3 Post-Lisbon 
Shortly after the ‘Laval quartet’, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force and the 
prospect of change was a fact. The introduction of social provisions, such as the 
social objectives in Article 3(3) TEU, implied that the EU had listened to the 
critique about its alleged ‘social deficit’. Whether these social innovations would 
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be enough to reorient the European integration project towards a more social 
Europe became a disputed and interesting topic of discussion. Today, almost 9 
years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this particular question is 
still relevant, and something I aim to discuss in the following section. 
 
In Commission v Germany, the Court rejected Germany’s line of argumentation 
based on the case of Albany and found that the public contracts fell within the 
scope of the public procurement directives and thus, needed to comply with the 
Treaty freedoms. Despite the Court’s finding that the German national policy 
constituted an unjustified restriction, the case does indicate a higher level of 
awareness in respect of social concerns. The Court made references to the need 
of reconciling conflicting interests as a way to verify that a fair balance had been 
struck, which indicates that the Court tried to consider the social objectives un-
derlying the national policy, i.e. worker protection, as well as the Treaty free-
doms. However, this attempt falls short since the balancing test subsequently 
applied by the Court was highly one-sided and reflected a preference of the in-
terests of the European integration project.248  
 
The Opinion by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Santos Palhota, offered an 
alternative and promising reasoning in respect of the balance between worker 
protection and the Treaty freedoms. The AG emphasised the significance of the 
normative commitments made by the EU through the Treaty of Lisbon and ar-
gued that the introduction of social provisions had altered the premises of inter-
nal market law by reconfiguration of the ‘right broadly/justifications strictly par-
adigm’.249 He stressed that a national rule with a worker protection objective 
should not be regarded as a ‘simple derogation’ from the Treaty freedoms and 
consequently not undergo a strict test of proportionality, as the one applied in, 
for instance, Laval and Viking. The recurring references to the social provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty and his call for a Union that lives up to its social obligations 
clearly indicate that the AG wanted to guide the Court in a direction that reflects 
a more social Europe. This endeavour was already apparent in the Opinion of 
AG Trstenjak in Commission v Germany, in which the AG presents a symmetrical 
approach to the reconciliation of conflicting interests, referred to as a ‘double 
proportionality test’, as an alternative method of adjudication. These attempts to 
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steer the Court in a more socially sensitive direction have, however, been unsuc-
cessful.250  
 
The case of Santos Palhota was subsequently decided by applying the traditional 
method of adjudication and without any references to the social primary law of 
the Union.251  
 
So far, the ECJ had primarily used the Treaty freedoms in its endeavour to es-
tablish an internal market without obstacles. However, in 2013 the Court deliv-
ered its judgment in the case of Alemo-Herron which contained a new innovative 
way of prioritising economic interests. Namely, by introducing the freedom to 
conduct business as a normative standard when conducting a fundamental rights 
review in order to safeguard the commercial freedom of employers.252  
 
At stake in Alemo-Herron was not national labour law, but an EU directive with a 
worker protection objective. The Court reinterpreted this objective by stressing 
that the Directive in fact seeks to ensure a ‘fair balance’ between the interests of 
the employees and the employer. By this reinterpretation, the ECJ established a 
legal basis that allowed the Court to protect the flexibility of employers, to the 
detriment of worker protection. When the Court ultimately interpreted the Di-
rective at issue, it clarified that this interpretation needs to comply with Article 
16 of the EU Charter, i.e. the freedom to conduct business. By reference to the 
essence of this right, the Court held that dynamic clauses in employment con-
tracts was not compatible with EU law. From a worker protection perspective, 
this ruling is not only problematic in respect of its outcome, i.e. the unenforce-
ability of dynamic clauses against a new employer after a transfer, but also due 
to the apparent lack of consideration for employees’ rights and interests.253 In 
my opinion, the reasoning in Alemo-Herron reflects a Court that is prone to favour 
the contractual freedom of employers at the expense of worker protection.  
 
Conclusively, after the judgment in Alemo-Herron, Article 16 of the EU Charter 
constituted a possible basis for challenges to legislation that restricted the com-
mercial freedom of undertakings, both at the European and national level. So 
far there was no indication that the changes to primary law, i.e. the introduction 
of social provisions, would bring about any substantive change to the Court’s 
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market-friendly approach. However, the Union’s social aspirations was reinvig-
orated by the case of AGET Iraklis, decided in the end of 2016.  
 
The reasoning in AGET Iraklis implies that the Court tried to take an approach 
that was more sensitive towards social concerns. In the case at issue, national 
legislation regulating collective redundancies with a worker protection objective 
was at stake. The Court reiterated that national legislation has to be examined in 
light of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to conduct a business 
and if it constitutes a restriction it needs to be justifiable and proportionate. In 
respect of this, the judgment of AGET Iraklis followed the Court’s traditional 
methodology. Nevertheless, the Court then explicitly referred to the social ob-
jectives in the Lisbon Treaty and pronounced that the Union has an economic 
and a social purpose, which means that Treaty freedoms have to be balanced 
against the social objectives of social policy measures. The reasoning shows a 
significant change of approach and reflects a more progressive Court in terms 
of the strive towards ‘Social Europe’. However, legal scholars have questioned 
the actual effect of these references.254 Professor Dagmar Schiek claims that the 
references to social policy objectives in the judgment loses any potential impact 
since they are not connected to their ‘fundamental rights basis’, which leaves the 
superiority of Article 16 of the EU Charter unquestioned.255  
 
The judgment in AGET Iraklis indicates that the Court’s approach towards the 
tension between worker protection and interests of the European integration 
project had shifted due to the introduction of social provisions. At least on a 
rhetorical level. The Court still applied the same method of adjudication with 
the premise that national legislation constitutes a restriction in need of justifica-
tion. However, the proportionality assessment conducted in AGET Iraklis was 
less strict and the Court also emphasised that the Member States have a ‘broad 
discretion’ when formulating their national policies. Conclusively, AGET Iraklis 
has to be considered as principally beneficial from a worker protection perspec-
tive, even if the Court applied its ‘traditional’ methodology as established in its 
jurisprudence.256  
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The case of Elektrobudowa concerned the debated issue of posted workers, simi-
larly to the cases of Laval and Viking. It has been considered to show an im-
portant shift in the Court’s previously restrictive approach towards national la-
bour standards, in this case, a minimum wage requirement. The ECJ provided a 
broad interpretation of what minimum wage could entail and allowed posted 
workers to assign their wage claims to the relevant trade union in the host coun-
try. Consequently, the judgment was beneficial for the protection of workers. 
However, it is possible to question whether the case should be regarded as re-
flecting a shift in the Court’s approach, since the fundamental concern in El-
ektrobudowa seemed to be the question of protecting fair competition between 
companies from different Member States. It is impossible to know for sure what 
the motivation behind the Court’s judgment was and whether it would choose 
to prioritise worker protection if it did not coincide with the interests of the 
European integration project.257  
 
In RegioPost, the Court was faced with a similar situation as in Rüffert. It concerned 
a regional provision stipulating a wage requirement in public procurement pro-
cedures and whether that provision infringed on the freedom to provide ser-
vices. Contrary to Rüffert, the Court found that the regional provision was in 
conformity with EU law since it qualified as a mandatory requirement that host 
countries have to guarantee posted workers, as stated in Article 3(1) of the 
Posted Workers Directive. The Court’s finding was thus beneficial from a 
worker protection perspective since the Court allowed a national labour standard 
to be enforceable in a cross-border situation. However, the Court went to great 
lengths to differentiate the situation in RegioPost from the one in Rüffert, possibly 
to avoid overturning its restrictive stance in Rüffert and to prevent protectionist 
measures from being introduced at the national level as a result of its ruling. 
Despite this, the judgment does reflect a different approach to the question of 
enforceability of national labour standards, suggesting that the Court of Justice 
has become more sensitive to social concerns.258 
 
Conclusively, the question of whether the introduction of social provisions in 
primary law has changed the Court of Justice’s approach in cases where worker 
protection conflicts with the interests of the European integration project is dif-
ficult to answer. On the one hand, there are cases which suggest that the Court 
has changed its approach substantially. In cases such as RegioPost, AGET Iraklis 
and Elektrobudowa, the Court took social concerns into consideration in a manner 
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that it had not done when adjudicating cases in the pre-Lisbon era. On the other 
hand, there are cases like Alemo-Herron in which the Court’s approach clearly 
reflects a bias towards the market and a disregard for the issue of worker pro-
tection. Thus, the Court’s jurisprudence is incoherent and sometimes even con-
tradictive.  
 
Case law from the post-Lisbon era shows that the Court is trying to find a more 
nuanced method of adjudication. References to social primary law, the acknowl-
edgement of the Union’s social purpose in addition to the economic, the aim to 
reconcile conflicting interests and strike a fair balance and the general receptive-
ness of national labour standards does reflect a change of approach. From a 
general point of view, these new aspects of the Court’s adjudication are highly 
positive and indicate that the Court has committed itself to the reorientation of 
the European integration project towards ‘Social Europe’. However, when re-
viewing the cases and the Court’s reasoning in detail this becomes debatable. 
Primarily due to the fact that they do not change the fundamental structure of 
internal market law and the method of adjudication applied by the Court. The 
balance struck in Laval, Viking and Rüffert is still the applicable norm. In other 
words, the Court still adjudicate cases on the basis of a broad conception of 
possible restrictions in combination with a narrow scope for justifications on 
social grounds. The recent cases might have introduced beneficial exceptions to 
this order, but it has not changed the fundamental structure of it.  
 
Moreover, the development in respect of the freedom to conduct business does 
not reflect a commitment towards realising ‘Social Europe’. Rather, it seems to 
be the Court’s new and innovative way to continue to safeguard interests of the 
European integration project, such as the contractual freedom of undertakings. 
To reconceptualise the interests of employers as a fundamental right, protected 
by the EU Charter, sends a strong message concerning the Court’s priorities. 
Even if the decision in AGET Iraklis reflects a more socially sensitive Court than 
in Alemo-Herron, it is the general development that is worrying. The Court did 
not need additional tools that benefit the process of European economic inte-
gration. It already had the superiority of the Treaty freedoms, the restrictions 
broadly/justification strictly paradigm, the strict proportionality assessment and 
the conception that national rules with a worker protection objective and social 
rights are prima facie restrictions. They all serves to ensure the supremacy of the 
economic, capitalist order that the EU is founded upon. 
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The Lisbon Treaty provided the Court with sufficient legal basis to change its 
adjudication and interpret EU law in a manner that coincides with the social 
aspirations of the Union. The ECJ’s case law in the post-Lisbon era is volatile 
and unpredictable and the small changes in approach that I have identified are 
not enough to rebalance the relationship between the ‘social’ and the ‘market’ 
and to fix the EU’s social deficit. Consequently, the ECJ needs to revise and 
adapt its approach further if it wants its case law to reflect the values inherent to 
‘Social Europe’, that is, a Union with an economic and a social purpose. The 
ultimate goal of such changes is to ensure that the Court’s approach and method 
of adjudication shows consideration and a sensitivity towards social concerns, 
no matter if it is a social right or a national measure with a worker protection 
objective at stake. 
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